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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of environmental concerns in the 1950s and 1960s' led
Congress to adopt a number of statutes designed to curtail the pro-
duction of air and water pollution as well as to promote the proper
handling, storage, and disposal of those substances capable of con-
taminating the nation's natural resources.2  Citizen suit provisions
were eventually incorporated into these environmental statutes3 in an
effort to supplement what many perceived to be less than diligent
governmental enforcement measures. 4  However, despite early con-
gressional efforts to regulate air and water pollution, disposal of
hazardous waste on land went largely unregulated. 5 This legislative
1. One authority has stated:
The shortcomings of the common law as a pollution control system attracted little atten-
tion through the first half of the twentieth century. But the postwar explosion of
American industry brought increased use of the environment as a dumping ground for
industrial by-products. As public disgust with brown skies and befouled waters mounted
in the 1950s and 1960s, legal commentators increasingly criticized the common law
remedies for pollution. A trickle of federal air and water pollution control statutes in
the 1950s swelled to a torrent in the 1960s.
Developments in the Law, Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1469 (1986).
2. See, for example, Clean Air Act C'CAA") Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676 (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Ace' or "CWA") Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (1994 ed.). See generally Barry Boyer
and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement- A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen
Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Bluff L. Rev. 833, 884-47 (1985); Frederick R.
Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Turlock, Environmental Protection- Law and
Policy 66 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1990). See also note 5.
3. For example, in 1970, Congress adopted § 304 of the Clean Air Act, the first environ-
mental citizen suit provision. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Two years later, Congress included a similar
measure in Section 505 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Indeed, nearly every envi-
ronmental statute adopted after 1970 includes a citizen suit provision. See note 45 and ac-
companying text.
4. Daniel Riesel, Citizen Suits and the Award of Attorneys' Fees in Environmental
Litigation, in ALr-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Litigation 1073, 1078-79 (June 20-24,
1994) ("The environmental movement of the sixties and early seventies was characterized, in
part, by citizens seeking legal procedures to give them a role in the enforcement of pollution
control standards") (citation omitted); Anderson, Mandelker and Turlock, Environmental
Protection at 111 (cited in note 2) ("in the early 1970s, at the beginning of the environmental
decade, environmentalists relied heavily on the courts to police what were perceived as hostile
agencies"). For an examination of the origins and purposes of the first environmental citizen
suits, see Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1469 (cited in note 1) (concluding that
"[t]hroughout this initial flood of environmental legislation, the problems posed by improper
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oversight resulted in the widespread transfer of air and water pollu-
tion, the disposal of which was highly regulated and incredibly expen-
sive, into land pollution, where unregulated disposal was a relative
bargain.6 Congress soon came to realize that simply transferring
pollution from one medium to another did little to reduce the envi-
ronmental risks of hazardous waste.7
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA")8 in an attempt to "eliminate the last
disposal of hazardous wastes remained something of a backwater"). See Barry Needleman,
Hazardous Waste Recycling Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Ac" Problems and
Potential Solutions, 24 Envir. L. 971, 975 (1994).
Early congressional efforts to abate land pollution resulted in the adoption of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act of 1965 ("SWDA"), Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat 997 (1965), originally codified
at 39 U.S.C. § 3251 et seq., now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V)
(requiring the initiation of a research and development program to promote the proper disposal
of solid and hazardous waste), and the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84
Stat. 1227 (1970) (outlining the basic recycling guidelines that would later be adopted in RCRA
as well as initiating certain study programs). However, these two statutes sought primarily to
restrict unsightly and unsanitary refuse dumping and to promote recycling of waste materials.
They neither recognized nor addressed problems caused by improper hazardous waste disposal."
Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1469 n.18. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Environmental Law 531-35 (West, 2d ed. 1994). Federal action under SWDA, for example,
centered principally on research and development. Although SWDA was amended in 1970 to
provide grants towards new solid waste management technology, the regulation of hazardous
waste remained primarily the role of state and local government. Robert V. Percival, et al.,
Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 214 (Little, Brown, 1992).
Other early responses to the issue of hazardous waste disposal centered around the problem
of contaminated groundwater supplies. Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974
C'SDWA"), Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300F et seq. (1988 ed.
& Supp. V), authorizing the EPA to implement drinking water standards, to establish a
"regulatory system to ensure compliance," and "to develop guidelines for state regulation of
underground injection of hazardous wastes"). Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1470.
The Act, however, proved terribly inadequate. "In focusing on improvement of the water coming
out of public drinking water supply systems, the Act did little to protect the public against harm
from contaminated groundwater caused by means other than ingestion. Moreover, the Act
failed to address unsafe means of hazardous waste disposal other than underground injection."
Id. at 1470.
6. Needleman, 24 Envir. L. at 975 (cited in note 5) (explaining that as a result of this
anomaly, "it was easier and cheaper to dispose of solid waste in the unregulated medium of land
rather than comply with the extensive and burdensome regulations accompanying waste
disposal in the air or water. For example, incinerating wastes might cost anywhere from $300
to $1,000 per ton while placing them in a landfill would cost as little as $50 per toen" (citation
omitted)).
7. Id. at 974-75.
8. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), codified in the Solid Waste Disposal Act at 42
U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V). RCRA was passed as a set of amendments to SWDA
and was signed and enacted October 21, 1976. RCRA has been subsequently amended by the
Quiet Communities Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat 3079 (1978), the Solid Waste
Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980), and by the
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
Commentators have described RCRA as "mind-numbing" and as the "most complicated" envi-
ronmental statute. Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions
of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envir. L. Rep. 10254 (1991). For a general
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remaining loophole in environmental law," that of unregulated
pollution transfers s  RCRA is a comprehensive environmental
statute0 designed to regulate solid and hazardous wastes from "cradle
description of RORA and its various citizen suit provisions, see Christopher Harris and Donavee
A. Berger, Civil Enforcement Authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, in
Janet S. Kole and Larry D. Espel., eds., Environmental Litigation 45, 45-46 (ABA, 1991);
Theodore L. Garrett, Citizen Suits in Kole and Espel, eds., Environmental Litigation 68, 68-70;
Adam Babich, The Federal Law of Environmental Public Nuisance: Citizen Imminent Hazard
Suits Under RCRA, in 2 ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Litigation, 987, 989-992
(June 21-25, 1993).
9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1976) (concluding that "[a]t present the federal government is spending billions of
dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water, only to dispose of such pollutants on the
land in an environmentally unsound manner.... This legislation will eliminate this problem
and permit the environmental laws to function in a coordinated and effective way").
Four years after the adoption of RCRA, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund. Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V).
CERCLA is designed to clean up sites already contaminated with hazardous substances.
CERCLA adopted four central mechanisms to achieve this objective:
(1) an information-gathering and reporting system; (2) a specification of federal author-
ity to respond to hazardous waste emergencies and clean up inactive dump sites; (3) the
creation of a fund to pay for the cleanup of inactive sites; and (4) the imposition of strict
liability on persons contributing to hazardous substance releases at inactive sites.
Rodgers, Environmental Law at 685 (cited in note 5). For general background regarding
CERCLA, see Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure (BNA, 1991).
While CERCLA is designed to remediate hazardous waste sites, RCRA, on the other hand, is
designed to prevent the need for such cleanups in the first place. Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
Harv. L. Rev. at 1464 (cited in note 1) ("In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) to regulate prospectively the transportation and disposal of hazardous
wastes. In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to address the problem of waste already generated
and stored") (citations omitted)). The statutes are designed, at least in theory, to work together
as a cohesive regulatory scheme. Rodgers, Environmental Law at 683-84 C'The Superfund law
came out of the same committees that worked on the 1980 Amendments to RCRA, and the two
statutes should be considered in pari materia. Thus CERCLA 'picks up where RCRA leaves
off...'" (quoting Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envir. L. 1, 35-36
(1982))); Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1540 ('CERCLA's sponsors introduced the
legislation primarily to fill a gap left by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1972").
10. William L. Kovacs and John F. Klucsik, The New Federal Role of Solid Waste
Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 Colum. J. Envir. L. 205
(1977) (concluding that RCRA was the first comprehensive federal approach to waste manage-
ment). While CAA generally regulates ambient air concentrations and CWA regulates points of
emission into water, RCRA regulates the treatment, storage and disposal of solid and hazardous
wastes regardless of whether the contamination takes the form of air, water, or land pollution.
To put it another way, RCRA is not "media specific." As William K. Reilly, former
Administrator of the EPA explains, "[w]hile some emergency power provisions of the six differ-
ent statutes are media specific, others are not. Media-specific statutes include the CAA
(releases affecting air), the CWA (released affecting water and adjoining shorelines), and SDWA
(releases likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water). In
contrast, CERCLA and RCRA apply to releases to all media (i.e., 'the environment defined
broadly)." Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Act; Enforcement Authority Guidance,
56 Fed. Reg. 24393, 24398 (May 30, 1991).
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to grave."11 Like nearly every modern environmental statute, RCRA
includes a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including a citizen suit
provision. 12
Despite certain unique advantages, 13 RCRA's citizen suit provi-
sion was not thought to provide for the recovery of past environmental
cleanup costs. As a result of this limitation, innocent landowners,
forced to remediate toxic waste sites before suing those at fault, were
occasionally left without a means to recover their environmental
cleanup costs. 14 Concerned by this dilemma, the Ninth Circuit, in
As evidence of the reach of RCRA's provisions, recent governmental estimates indicate that
a comprehensive RCRA remediation program for private facilities would cover over 5,000 sites
at a cost of up to forty-two billion dollars. John Graubert, Corrective Action Under RCRA, in
ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Law 117, 119 (Feb. 17-19, 1994).
11. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1590, 128 L. Ed. 2d
302 (1994); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1491 at 5 (cited in note 9). RCRA was designed with three general goals: (1) "to
provide technical and financial assistance for the development of management plans and
facilities for the recovery of energy and other resources from discarded materials," (2) "to
provide for the safe disposal of discarded materials," and (3) "to regulate the management of
hazardous waste." Wiliam B. Johnson, Right to Maintain Citizen Suit Under § 7002 of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 6972), 91 A.L.R. Fed. 436, 445 (1989). See RCRA
§ 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 6902.
Although RCRA imposes liability for both past and present violations most courts have
concluded that RCRA is generally prospective in that those past or present acts must continue
to present a regulatory violation or environmental endangerment. See, for example, United
States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that RCRA's EPA imminent haz-
ard provision, § 7003, "neither punishes past wrongdoing nor imposes liability for injuries
inflicted by past acts. Rather, as defendants themselves argue, its orientation is essentially
prospective. When construed in this manner, the statute is simply not retroactive. It merely
relates to current and future conditions").
12. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. See note 46.
13. See Theodore L. Garrett, ed., The RCRA Practice Manual 234-45 (ABA, 1994) ("In
several respects, the citizen suit provisions in RCRA are broader than those found in other
environmental statutes. First, actions can be maintained to abate imminent and substantial
endangerments as well as to abate violations of regulations and permits. Second, civil penalties
can be recovered. Third, there is no lengthy notice period prior to filing for violations of
hazardous waste regulations. On the other hand, the RCRA citizen suit provisions are narrower
than those found under other statutes, in that they cannot be used to challenge siting and
permitting decisions. In addition, the practical evidentiary burdens facing a plaintiff are
greater under RCRA because the regulatory program is so much more complex").
14. This problem is perhaps most evident in the area of water petroleum cleanups.
CERCLA provides for the recovery of environmental cleanup costs. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (imposing liability for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan"). However, CERCLA liability
extends only to hazardous substances. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining the
term hazardous substance so as to exclude petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under sub-
paragraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph. . . "). See Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700, 704
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that CERCLA § 101(14) excludes oil and gas from its definition of a
"hazardous substance"); Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801,
804 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the application of the standards governing statutory construc-
tion to the words of the petroleum exclusion requires us to exclude gasoline, even leaded
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KFC Western Inc. v. Meghrig, broke with traditional thinking and
held that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision provides plaintiffs a
private right of action to recover their past environmental response
gasoline, from the term 'hazardous substance' for purposes of CERCLA. Any other construction
ignores the plain meaning of the statute and renders the petroleum exclusion a nullity").
Conversely, while RCRA does not authorize the recovery of past response costs, see Part
IV.A., it does apply to waste petroleum. Under most of RCRA's provisions, a waste must be
considered both a solid and a hazardous waste in order to come within RCRA's control. Despite
the misleading nature of the term, solid waste can include "any solid, liquid, semisolid, or con-
tained gaseous material." Adam Babich, Comment, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A
Powerful Tool for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen Enforcers, 24 Envir. L. Rep. 10122,
10126 (1994). Solid waste basically includes:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant,
or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid,
semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining,
and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid or
dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation re-
turn flows, or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under
[the Clean Water Act, nor does it include] source, special nuclear, or byproduct materi-
als, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). RCRA also defines "hazardous waste" in broad terms.
The statutory definition of "hazardous waste" includes any solid waste or combination of solid
wastes
which because of its quality, concentration, or physical, chemical or infectious character-
istics may:
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an in-
crease in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed
of, or otherwise managed.
Id. § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
While RCRA's provisions generally require that a plaintiff go through this process of proving
that the waste is both a solid and hazardous waste, this is not true when the basis of the suit is
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision. As Adam Babich explains, for most of RCRA's
provisions "a substance cannot be a hazardous waste unless it is a solid waste. As defined in
Subtitle C, the term 'solid waste' applies only to substances that also qualify as Subtitle C haz-
ardous wastes.... Under § 7002(a)(1)(B), however, the difference between 'solid' and
'hazardous' waste hardly matters because the provision applies equally to 'solid or hazardous
waste."' Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10124-25 (citation omitted). The potential impact on pol-
luters is significant. As Babich again explains, "[b]ecause § 7002(a)(1)(B) employs these
stripped-down, statutory definitions, many of those who are fortunate enough to be exempt from
the Subtitle C hazardous waste regulatory program ... will find they are not immune from
RCRA imminent hazard actions:' Id. at 10126-27.
Using this analysis, nearly every court to address the issue has held that waste petroleum is
among the types of solid or hazardous waste covered by RCRA § 7002. See, for example,
Nicholas J. Murlas Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 195 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12037, *21 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17,
1995); Dydio v. Hesston Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1037, 1948 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Agricultural Excess &
Surplus Ins. Co. v. A.B.D. Tank & Pump Co., 878 F. Supp. 476, 482 (D. Minn. 1995); Zands v.
Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1261-64 (S.D. Cal. 1991), modified, 797 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992);
Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17668, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
15, 1993); Buggsi, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1427, 431 (D. Or. 1994); Petropoulos
v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 511, 516 (S.D. Ohio 1993). But see Winston v. Shell
Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 713, 717 (C.D. Il. 194) (holding that waste petroleum was not meant to be
regulated as a hazardous solid substance," reasoning that waste petroleum should be regulated
under RCRA's UST program found in RCRA §§ 9001-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-91(i).
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costs.15 Shortly thereafter, the Eighth Circuit, in Furrer v. Brown,
rejected the reasoning of KFC, denying the recovery of response costs
under similar circumstances.16 In September 1995, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear KFC to resolve the circuit court split.1'
The Supreme Court in KFC sought to address two separate but
unrelated issues. The first was whether RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B)
requires the solid or hazardous waste to present a continuing endan-
germent at the time the law suit is filed.18 The second was whether
RCRA authorizes the recovery of environmental response costs or is
simply intended to provide injunctive relief.19 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, holding that RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision not only requires the presence of a
continuing endangerment at the time the law suit is filed, but also
does not provide plaintiffs a private right of action to recover remedia-
tion costs expended to abate wholly past endangerments.20 The Court,
however, expressly reserved the question of whether the provision
authorizes plaintiffs to recover response costs expended after the
commencement of the lawsuit.2 1 This Note will answer this unre-
solved issue, and assess the continued viability of RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision.
This Note begins, in Part II, by describing the origins and legal
history of the environmental citizen suit. Part III examines the ef-
forts of the courts to define the scope of RCRA's various citizen suit
provisions, including the conflicting approaches of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits in applying Section 7002(a)(1)(B), RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision. Having constructed the basic analytical
framework, Part III proceeds to outline the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of the circuit court split in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. Part IV
further examines the KFC decision, concluding that while the Court
correctly held that Section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not provide a private
right of action to recover environmental response costs expended to
abate "wholly past endangerments,"22 the Court's decision should not
15. 46 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995).
16. 62 F.3d 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 1995).
17. 116 S. Ct. 41, 132 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1995).
18. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955, *8-9 (Mar. 19, 1996).
19. Id. at *9.10.
20. Id. at *8-10.
21. Id. at *15-16. See Part IV.B.2.
22. It is important to distinguish between three very different types of environmental en-
dangerments potentially covered by RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision. First, the solid or
hazardous waste could have presented an endangerment at some time in the past but that has
remediated prior to the filing of the suit. Such endangerments, often referred to as "wholly past
endangerments," are not covered by RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *9.
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be construed as prohibiting the recovery of response costs under all
circumstances. Finally, having examined the Court' analysis in KFC,
Part V concludes by proposing an interpretation of RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision that would authorize citizen-plaintiffs to recover
reasonable response costs under certain proscribed circumstances and
yet comply with RCRA's preliminary requirements.23 The interpreta-
tion advanced in this Note not only adheres to the comprehensive
regulatory scheme devised by Congress, but also promotes RCRA's
primary objective-the prompt abatement of imminent hazards.24
II. ORIGIN AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CITIZEN SUIT
The federal environmental regulatory scheme as originally
designed in the 1950s and 1960s proved largely ineffective due to the
failure of Congress to provide federal statutes with workable enforce-
ment mechanisms.2 5 As environmental concerns began to achieve
widespread support,26 Congress sought to remedy this glaring problem
by enlarging the scope of the federal government's enforcement
authority.27 However, fearful that federal agencies either would not 28
Second, the solid or hazardous waste could present a continuing endangerment throughout the
entire litigation process. RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision clearly applies to these types
of endangerments. Id. at *9-10. The remaining situation involves solid or hazardous waste
which presented an imminent endangerment at the time the suit was filed but which have since
been abated. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this particular situation. Id. at *15-16.
It is this final situation that is the focus of this Note.
23. This would include, for example, providing adequate notice to the appropriate parties,
as required by RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A), and demonstrating the existence
of a continuing endangerment at the time the lawsuit was filed.
24. See notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
25. Jeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Law
3 (John Wiley & Sons, 1987) (concluding that the "enforcement mechanisms of federal environ-
mental statutes in the 1960s were both cumbersome and ineffective"). This view is supported by
Senator Edwin Muskie's observation during the congressional debate over the Clean Air Act
that state and federal regulations had failed to adequately enforce the environmental provisions
and that "more tools" were needed to guarantee effective enforcement in the future. Id. at 4 n.2.
See generally H. Edward Dunkelberger, Jr., The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Water
Pollution Under the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965, 3 Nat. Res. Law 3 (1970); Henry L. Pitts,
The Interaction of the Federal and State Systems: The Experience in the Central U.S., 3 Nat.
Res. Law 26 (1970); Murray Stein, The Actual Operation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration, 3 Nat. Res. Law 41 (1970).
26. Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1470 (cited in note 1) (explaining that "[a]s
evidence of the risks attending improper disposal of hazardous wastes accumulated throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, the pressure for legislative action grew").
27. Having determined that no single enforcement mechanism could ensure compliance
with the nation's environmental laws, Congress began to incorporate a variety of new enforce-
ment mechanisms into environmental legislation, including "administrative orders; administra-
tively assessed penalties, easy access to courts for injunctive relief, civil penalties and criminal
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or could not29 successfully ensure compliance with the nation's envi-
ronmental regulations without additional prodding and assistance,30
Congress developed the citizen suit as a way to supplement govern-
mental action.31
sanctions; and a variety of self-help measures for the enforcement agencies such as stop sale
orders, seizures, and funds to clean up pollution with recoupment against the responsible
party." Miller, Citizen Suits at 4 n.2 (cited in note 25). In addition, most major federal anti-
pollution laws have for years allowed the Administrator of the EPA to seek injunctions to abate
imminent and substantial endangerments. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10128 (cited in note 14).
See also Rodgers, Environmental Law at 540 (cited in note 5) (noting that "[m]ost of the envi-
ronmental laws contain emergency provisions allowing agency authorities to play leapfrog with
the established procedures and move swiftly against obvious hazards"). Currently, at least six
environmental statutes contain some form of EPA imminent hazard or emergency provision.
CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603; CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606; CWA § 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364;
RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973; SDWA § 1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300i; TSCA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
28. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970) ('Government initiative in
seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring
suits for violations .... should motivate governmental ... enforcement and abatement proceed-
ings"). See also Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639
F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that "Congress then believed that the federal
Government had been 'restrained' and 'notoriously laggard' in exacting obedience to pollution
control requirements") (quoting National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S. Rep. No. 91-
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1971)); Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215,
218 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that "Congress intended citizen suits both to goad the responsible
agencies to more vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies re-
mained intact, to provide an alternative enforcement mechanism); National Resource Defense
Council, Inc., v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that citizen suits were viewed
by Congress as one way of resolving the EPA's "lack of aggressiveness" in abating pollution).
See generally National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. 116 Cong. Rec. 32927 (1970) (quoting Senator Muskie: "I think it is too much to pre-
sume that, however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agencies, they will be
able to monitor the potential violations" of the CAA); id. at 33104 (quoting Senator Gary Hart:
"In legislation of this type, we will find very likely noncompliance which in number or degree
are far beyond the capacity of the Government to respond to").
30. Philip Key, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation: Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Citizen Suits, 19 Envir. L. 93, 96 (1988) (explaining that "[a]gencies were sus-
ceptible to agency capture, lack of funds for enforcement, and a mandate larger than they could
manage. Consequently, Congress adopted citizen enforcement as a means of recapturing the
country's environmental priorities"). The general fear that the federal agencies had been overly
eager to appease industry was due to the perceived failure of the governmental agencies in en-
forcing environmental provisions. As Miller explains, "[i]t is clear that governmental action
against perceived threats to public health from past hazardous waste practices has fallen far
short of public and congressional demand and expectation. Miller, Citizen Suits at 9 n.32 (cited
in note 25).
31. See David S. Mann, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures:
Effective Uses or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 Envir. L. 175,
180 (1991) (concluding that although citizen suits were originally intended to guard against the
perceived failure of federal agencies to enforce environmental statutes, citizen suit provisions
are now viewed by many as essential to supplement federal enforcement capabilities in an age
of dwindling governmental resources); Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10127 (cited in note 14)
(explaining that advocates of citizen suits contend that this form of private enforcement serves
three general purposes: (1) to prevent the production and spread of pollution, (2) to promote
compliance with environmental regulations, and (3) to force federal agencies into taking action
against polluters) (citing Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983, H.R. Rep. No.
98-198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 53 (1983))).
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Congress authorized the first citizen suit provision by adopting
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.32 Debate over
the adoption of the provision was heated and, as a result, the end
product was something of a compromise.33 Those opposed to the
measure feared that citizen suits would flood the federal court
system.34 In the end, however, opponents of Section 304 came to see
the political danger of voting against a pro-environmental measure at
the "outset of the environmental decade" and eventually supported
the adoption of the provision.35
As originally designed in the CAA, the citizen suit provision
only authorized two types of actions: 36 (1) suits against those in viola-
tion of the statute's provisions, regulations or orders,37 and (2) actions
against the Administrator of the EPA for failing to discharge manda-
tory duties. 38 Although Section 304 provided citizens a private right of
action to enforce CAA's provisions and regulations, it did not author-
ize the recovery of monetary damages. 39 Rather, citizens were to act
However, citizen suit provisions are not without their critics. See, for example, Robert F.
Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the
Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 Ga. L. Rev.
337 (1988); Harold J. Krent and Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 1793, 1794-96 (1993). At least one commentator observed that the RCRA's immi-
nent citizen suit provision could have a backlash effect. Miller theorized that RCRA!s provision
to allow citizens to sue to abate imminent and substantial endangerments would draw the
courts into:
uncertain and thorny issues of what constitutes an endangerment and what remedy
may be appropriate. In essence, the amendment allows private citizens to bring public
nuisance cases under the guise of RCRA. The merits of this amendment are open to de-
bate. The citizen suit sections were not originally designed with this type of action in
mind. Efforts to blunt arguments against the amendment lead to anomalous results in
its provisions. Indeed, if arguments against are vindicated, a resulting backlash could
adversely affect the use of citizen suits for more traditional purposes.
Miller, Citizen Suits at 9-10 (cited in note 25) (footnotes omitted).
32. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (1970), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1988 ed. & Supp. V).
33. Miller, Citizen Suits at 5 (cited in note 25).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7 (explaining that the environmental citizen suit provisions "authorize 'any per-
son' to commence suit to enforce the requirements of the acts against 'any person' alleged to
violate them or to require the government to perform a mandatory duty under the acts").
37. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10127 (cited in note 14).
38. Id. Originally, most citizen suits were brought under the second type of citizen suit
provision as large environmental organizations sought to change governmental regulations for
entire industries rather than enforce regulations at a single site. In recent years, however, the
number of citizen suits of the first type has grown enormously. See Miller, Citizen Suits at 10-
12 (cited in note 25).
39. Miller, Citizen Suits at 7 (cited in note 25) (noting that the primary remedy in envi-
ronmental citizen suits is injunctive relief). Further evidence supporting this conclusion is
found in the congressional debates over adoption of § 304, the first environmental citizen suit
provision. When confronted with criticisms that the citizen suit provision of the CAA would
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as "private attorneys general.."40  In addition, citizen plaintiffs were
required to give notice of the suit to the EPA, the appropriate state
authority, and the defendant.41 Having deprived potential private
plaintiffs of much of the incentive to file suit under Section 304,
Congress provided for the recovery of attorney's fees, but tempered
the provision by creating the risk that fee awards could be imposed
against plaintiffs as well as defendants. 42
Despite contentious congressional debate over the adoption of
Section 304, the original environmental citizen suit provision, use of
private enforcement mechanisms has become the norm in federal
environmental regulations. Shortly after adopting the first citizen
suit provision, Congress included a citizen suit provision in the Clean
Water Act based nearly entirely on Section 304 of the Clean Air Act.43
Indeed, during the 1970s, Congress adopted a cut and paste
mentality," incorporating citizen suit provisions based on Section 304
overburden the courts with countless cases, Senator Muskie responded that "a citizen suit can
only be brought to enforce the provisions of the act or the requirements that are established as a
result of the operations of the act." 116 Cong. Rec. 32927 (cited in note 29). See also Miller,
Citizen Suits at 10 n.3.
40. Natural Resources Defense Council, 484 F.2d at 1337 (stating that "[tihe Committee
realized that federal or state enforcement resources might be insufficient, and that federal
agencies themselves might sometimes be polluters; the citizen suit provision created 'private
attorneys general' to aid in enforcement'). Most cases interpreting RCRA's citizen suit
provision have concluded that the plaintiff must act as a private attorney general. See, for
example, Fallowfield Development Corp. v. Strunk, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6233, *37 (E.D.
Pa. May 11, 1993); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th
Cir. 1983); Kaufman and Broad-South Bay v. UNISYS Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Commerce
Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Portsmouth
Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. BMI Apartments Associates, 847 F. Supp. 380, 385
(E.D. Va. 1994).
41. CAA § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b). See Miller, Citizen Suits at 8-9 (cited in note 25).
42. CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). See Miller, Citizen Suits at 9 (cited in note 25).
43. Miller, Citizen Suits at 6 (cited in note 25) (concluding that Congress would basically
'lift' the citizen suit provision from the CAA and "transpose it with only the most cursory con-
forming changes into other environmental statutes").
44. Id. at 7 (stating that "[t]he citizen suit sections of the various environmental statutes
are virtually identical, being patterned closely after Clean Air Act § 304. There are perhaps no
sections of the environmental statutes where precedent under one statute so clearly applies to
others. To the extent the sections differ from statute to statute, the changes reflect differences
in the structure or scheme of the statute involved, or a quirk at the time enacted"); Jeffrey G.
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: The Citizen Suit Provisions, in 3
ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Litigation 997, 1001 (June 26-30, 1995) ("Because of
the similarity of the citizen suit provisions in the various environmental statutes and the rela-
tive abundance of its legislative history in the CAA compared to the other statutes, the CAA
legislative history is used to interpret the provisions in other statutes").
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of the Clean Air Act into nearly every environmental
statute, 45 including the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act.4
45. Act to Prevent Pollution From Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (1994 ed.); CERCLA § 310, 42
U.S.C. § 9659 (1988 ed.); Deepwater Ports Act ("DPA") § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994 ed.); Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427 (1994 ed.); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act ("EMPCRTKA!') § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1988 ed.); Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6305 (1988 ed.); Federal Water Pollution Control Act C'CWA") § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994 ed.);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (VIPRSA") § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)
(1994 ed.); Natural Forests Act, 15 U.S.C. § 544(m)(b) (1994 ed.); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1686 (1988 ed.); Noise Control Act ("NCA") § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988 ed.);
Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124 (1988 ed.); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988 ed.); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 8435 (1988 ed.); RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988 ed.); SDWA § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8
(1994 ed.); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act CSMCRA") § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270
(1988 ed.); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994 ed.).
At least one environmental statute, however, does not contain a citizen suit provision.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act C(FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1994 ed.).
Miller notes that this apparent anomaly "is explained by the fact that either or both the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee... and the House Commerce and Transportation
Committee are the authorizing committees for all of this legislation except FIFRA. FIFRA is
the exclusive domain of the more conservative Agriculture Committees in both houses of
Congress." Miller, Citizen Suits at 6 (cited in note 25).
Citizens suit provisions, however, are hardly unique to environmental statutes. Congress
has authorized private enforcement action in a number of other statutes. See, for example,
Consumer Product Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-3, 2000e-5 (1988 ed. & Supp. V); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994 ed.), Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1994 ed.). The difference in environmental law is that citizens had
never before been "specifically empowered and expected to act as real private attorneys general
vindicating the statutory rights of the community at large rather than the plaintiffs own eco-
nomic losses." Miller, Citizen Suits at 1 (cited in note 25). See generally Stephen Fotis,
Comment, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and The Clean Water Act, 35 Am. U. L. Rev.
127, 132-34 (1985).
46. RCRA's citizen suit provision, § 7002, currently provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf-
(1) (A) against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become ef-
fective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person ... including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing
to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district court shall have jurisdiction... to enforce the permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain
any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred
to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as may be neces-
sary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the act or duty referred to in
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III. RCRA's CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
RCRA's original citizen suit provision, like most environmental
statutes adopted during the 1970s, closely parallels CAA Section
304.47 As a result, when Congress adopted RCRA Section 7002, the
provision included the two traditional types of citizen suits: actions
against the Administrator of the EPA for failing to discharge manda-
tory duties,4 and suits against those in violation of RCRA's provi-
sions, regulations, and orders. 49 In 1984, however, Congress amended
Section 7002 to provide a third type of citizen suit authorizing private
actions to abate "imminent and substantial endangerments to health
or the environment."5° While at least six environmental statutes,
including RCRA, authorize the Administrator of the EPA to bring suit
to abate imminent hazards, 51 RCRA is the only environmental statute
that extends this power to private citizens. 52
Although the right granted by RCRA's citizen suit provision is
broader than that of any other environmental citizen suit provision,53
this right is tempered by the limited remedies RCRA authorizes. 54
paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section [3008](a) and (g) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (emphasis added).
47. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
48. This type of citizen suit is currently located at RCRA § 7002(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(2). While acknowledging the importance of RCRA § 7002(a)(2), this Note focuses on
those provisions used against polluters rather than those used to prod the EPA into taking ac-
tion.
49. This type of citizen suit is currently located at RCRA § 7002(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(A). The provision was originally located at RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
50. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3269 (1984), RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), codified at 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B) (1988 ed. & Supp. V). Congress amended § 7002 under the assumption that "this
expansion of the citizens suit provision will complement.., the [EPA] Administrator's efforts to
eliminate threats as to public health and the environment, particularly where the Government
is unable to take action...." H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31).
51. See note 27.
52. In so doing, Congress simply extended RCRA's governmental imminent hazard
authority in § 7003 to include "any person."
53. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10127-28 (cited in note 14).
54. It has been said that in environmental law, "remedy defeats have a way of swallowing
substantive victories." Rodgers, Environmental Law at 549 (cited in note 5). See also Stuart P.
Feldman, Curbing the Recalcitrant Polluter: Post Decree Judicial Agents in Environmental
Litigation, 18 B.C. Envir. Affi L. Rev. 809 (1991) (concluding that "a court's choice of a remedy
may be as critical to the litigants interests and the public weal as the substantive conduct rules
that establish polluters' liability").
Professor Rodgers explains that this problem has also proven to be true in the context of
RCRA. In discussing the governmenes power under RCRA § 7003 to sue to abate imminent
hazards, a provision nearly identical to the imminent citizen suit provision in § 7002(a)(1)(B),
Rodgers contends that "the strong substance of§ 7003 is achieved partially at the expense of the
remedy. It is as if the courts pay heed seriatim to the victims of pollution and then to victims of
proposals to clean it up. Even at the preliminary injunction stage, relief sought by the govern-
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Under Section 7002(a)(1)(A), RCRA's "enforcement" citizen suit provi-
sion, courts may issue an injunction ordering a defendant to comply
with RCRA's standards and requirements. 5   Under Section
7002(a)(1)(B), RCRA's "imminent" citizen suit provision, courts may
"restrain" a defendant responsible for the "past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-
ous waste" as well as order a defendant "to take such other action as
may be necessary.56 In addition, courts are authorized under both
provisions to assess civil penalties consistent with RCRA Sections
3008(a) and (g).5 7 However, unlike CERCLA,58 RCRA does not ex-
pressly provide a private cause of action to recover environmental
response costs.
The 1984 Amendments undoubtedly expanded the scope of
liability under RCRA's citizen suit provision. It is, however, less clear
to what extent the Amendments were intended to do so. 9 Resolving
this complex question requires close scrutiny of the legislative and
judicial history of three provisions within RCRA: (1) Section
7002(a)(1)(A), RCRA's enforcement citizen suit provision; (2) Section
7003, RCRA's governmental imminent suit provision; and (3) Section
7002(a)(1)(B), RCRA's novel addition to the world of private enforce-
ment mechanisms, the imminent citizen suit provision.
A. Private Citizen Enforcement Authority Under Section 7002(a)(1)(A)
RCRA's enforcement citizen suit provision authorizes any
person to file a suit "against any person.., who is alleged to be in
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this
chapter."60 The scope of remedies available to private parties under
ment has been qualified, moderated, and shunned." Rodgers, Environmental Law at 549 (cited
in note 5) (footnote omitted).
55. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A).
56. Id. § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). The language used in RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision essentially incorporates the same language as Section 7003, the EPA's imminent haz-
ard authority, and was intended by Congress to impose the same standard of liability. See note
78.
57. RCRA §§ 3008(a) and (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a) and (g). In addition to RCRA, only
CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 and CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 provide for civil penalties.
Plaintiffs have often used the threat of civil penalties as a way to broker monetary settlements.
These types of settlements are called Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures ('EBEs"). For
discussion of EBEs, see Allison Fisher, Air and Water Quality, 21 Envir. L. 1117, 1136 (1991);
Mann, 21 Envir. L. at 178-79 (cited in note 31).
58. Part IV.A.3.
59. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094 n4.
60. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
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this provision was first addressed in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Lamphier.6' There, two private environmental groups sued the
owners and operators of an industrial waste disposal site under
RCRA's citizen suit provision. They alleged a variety of hazardous
waste violations, including violations of RCRA's notification2 and
permit 63 requirements. 64 The district court found for the plaintiffs and
issued an injunction ordering the defendants to comply with RCRA's
hazardous waste regulations.5 The Fourth Circuit upheld the injunc-
tion, but with the caveat that RCRA authorizes a court to issue such
an order only in those cases where plaintiffs are acting as "private
attorneys general66 for the benefit of the community at large rather
than pursing a purely private remedy. According to the Fourth
Circuit in Lamphier, this limitation bars plaintiffs from receiving
substantive reliefb7 under RCRA's citizen suit provision. Although the
court did not explain precisely what it meant by substantive relief,
the court's ruling strongly implied that monetary relief is not recover-
able under Section 7002(a)(1)(A). Indeed, the Court concluded that
the plaintiffs were not even entitled to monitor the contaminated site
to ensure that the defendants were adhering to the injunction.68 This
function was left to the government alone.
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit directly addressed the issue
of whether plaintiffs could recover monetary damages under Section
7002(a)(1)(A). In Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,69 residents filed a
class action law suit against the past and present owners and opera-
tors of a local landfill as well as certain generators who had disposed
of hazardous waste at the site.70 The plaintiffs not only requested
injunctive relief ordering compliance with RCRA, but also sought
monetary relief for damages resulting from the violations of RCRA's
hazardous waste regulations.1 The court held that, while RCRA's
enforcement citizen suit provision authorizes the courts to order
injunctions, the provision does not provide for monetary relief72 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the order for injunctive relief and
61. 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
62. RCRA § 3010, 42 U.S.C. § 6930.
63. Id. § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
64. Lamphier, 714 F.2d at 335.
65. Id. at 335.
66. Id. at 337.
67. Id. at 337 n.4.
68. Id.
69. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 313-14.




concluding that RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(A) does not permit a private
action for damages. 73 The court acknowledged that while the scope of
liability under RCRA's original citizen suit provision is broad, the
remedies available under the provision are restricted to injunctive
and other equitable relief.74
Both Walls and Lamphier help clarify the scope of RCRA's
citizen suit provision. Neither, however, directly address the scope of
Section 7002(a)(1)(B), RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision. Both
cases focus instead on Section 7002(a)(1)(A), RCRA's traditional
enforcement citizen suit provision. The 1984 Amendments, however,
significantly expanded the type of relief available under RCRA
Section 7002. Specifically, the Amendments allow a court to order the
defendant to "take such other action as may be necessary" to abate an
"imminent and substantial endangerment."75 Determining when an
environmental threat must be "imminent" and what constitutes a
"necessary" action remains the primary focus of this Note. Resolving
these two questions as they relate to RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision first requires an understanding of RCRA Section 7003, the
EPA's imminent hazard authority.
B. EPA Imminent Hazard Authority Under Section 7003
Since its adoption in 1976, RCRA has authorized the
Administrator of the EPA to sue to abate an imminent threat to pub-
lic health or the environment.7 6 Section 7003(a) essentially provides
that whenever the "handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment," the Administrator may ask a court to
restrain the person contributing to the hazard or "to take such other
73. Id. at 316. The plaintiffs also unsuccessfully sought monetary damages under CWA's
citizen suit provision. Id. at 314. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 13675(a). The Supreme Court in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 18 (1981).
concluded that Congress did not intend to authorize an implied private remedy under CWA and
refused to consider a private action for monetary damages.
74. Walls, 761 F.2d at 315. For other cases limiting RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A) to continuing or
intermittent violations., see Dydio, 887 F. Supp. at 1043; City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials &
Services, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Gache, 813 F. Supp. at 1041; Fallowfield
Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4820, *1, *20 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990); Chartrand v.
Chrysler Corp., 785 F. Supp. 666, 669-70 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 413, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
75. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
76. Interestingly, the legislative history of RCRA as originally adopted never mentioned §
7003, leaving the courts to determine its purpose and scope. This apparently had much to do
with the haste in which the Congress passed RCRA. See Kovacs and Klucsik, 3 Colum J. Envir.
L. at 216-20 (cited in note 10).
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action as may be necessary."17 The 1984 Amendments to RCRA give
this authority to private citizens as well. Indeed, according to RCRA's
legislative history, Congress intended that liability under Sections
7002(a)(1)(B) and 7003 would be identical.78 However, while most
courts have been reluctant to liberally interpret RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision, the courts have often been lenient when con-
struing the EPA's imminent hazard authority. Specifically, a number
of courts have authorized the Administrator to recover restitutionary
damages under RCRA Section 7003,79 while only a handful have
authorized restitution under Section 7002(a)(1)(B).80
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Price,s1 was the first
court to order a defendant to make monetary payments to the EPA to
abate an imminent hazard under RCRA's EPA imminent hazard
provision. In Price, a New Jersey landfill improperly disposed of
approximately nine million gallons of hazardous chemical and indus-
trial waste.8 2 Much of the waste leached into the groundwater,
77. RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), provides in relevant part:
[U]pon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may
bring suit... against any person... who has contributed or who is contributing to such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from
[such activity], to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or
both.
78. H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5612 (cited in note 31)
(explaining that "liability under § 7002(a)(1)(B) mirrors the standards of liability established un-
der Section 7003"); Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1983, S. Rep. No. 98-284, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1983) ("These amendments [adding § 7002(a)(1)(B)] are intended to allow
citizens the same broad substantive and procedural claim for relief which is already available to
the United States under § 7003. Any differences in language between these amendments and §
7003 are not intended to effect a difference in such claims, but merely clarity that citizens have
the same claim presently available to the United States"). See also Connecticut Coastal
Fishermen's Assn. v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305, 1315 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
the federal regulations concerning § 7003 must also apply to § 7002(a)(1)(B) because the two
provisions are "nearly identicar'); Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority, 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that "[s]ince Congress had not yet
enacted § 7002(a)(1)(B) when EPA wrote this regulation, we take § 7003 to stand for the nearly
identical § 7002(a)(1)(B) as well"). Indeed, if this were not the case, citizen suits would not
perform their intended function. Miller explains:
If citizen enforcers had access to lesser injunctive remedies than government enforcers
or were subject to greater burdens to obtain injunctive remedies, citizen suit provisions
would not perform their intended functions. Citizen plaintiffs would not be real private
attorneys general. Indeed, it would be highly advantageous for violating polluters to be
enforced against by citizen enforcers rather than by the government, particularly if the
government is subsequently bound by the result of the citizen suit.
Miller, Citizen Suits at 25 (cited in note 25).
79. See Part III.B.
80. See Part III.C.
81. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 208.
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threatening Atlantic City's sole supply of water.83 The government
sued various past and present owners and operators of the landfill,
requesting that the court issue a preliminary injunction ordering the
defendants to fund a diagnostic study of the threat to the local water
supply and to guarantee an alternative water supply to those home-
owners whose private wells had already been contaminated8 4 The
district court rejected both forms of relief, holding as a matter of law
that the remedies were "inappropriate forms of preliminary relief."'' 5
The Third Circuit affirmed the result reached by the district
court,88 but held that the court's analysis of the government's requests
was unnecessarily restrictive and that the requests were not barred
as a matter of law.8 7 RCRA's imminent hazard provision, the court
explained, authorizes the federal courts to exercise their full equitable
authority8s to abate imminent and substantial environmental hazards,
including the authority to order a defendant to fund a diagnostic
study.
Although the Third Circuit did take the important step8 9 of
authorizing monetary payments as a form of equitable relief under
RCRA Section 7003, the court was careful to limit its holding, restrict-
83. Id. at 209.
84. Id. at 208.
85. Id. at 209. The district court decided that the request for monetary payments to fund
the diagnostic study was merely a way to turn a claim for damages into a claim for equitable re-
lief in the form of an injunction mandating monetary payments. Id. at 211.
86. Id. The Third Circuit declared that the question of appropriate relief was a matter for
the district court and that it did not abuse its discretion. The Third Circuit explained that
having balanced the relevant factors, the decision to wait to order relief until after a full trial
may have been the most reasonable course of action for the district court to take. Id.
87. Id. The court explained that "[a] request for funds for a diagnostic study of the public
health threat posed by the continuing contamination and its abatement is not, in any sense, a
traditional form of damages. The funding of a diagnostic study in the present case, though it
would require monetary payments, would be preventive rather than compensatory. The study
is intended to be the first step in the remedial process of abating an existing but growing toxic
hazard which, if left unchecked, will result in even graver future injury, i.e., the contamination
of Atlantic City's water supply." Id. at 212.
88. Id. at 214. The court noted that "[b]y enacting the endangerment provisions of RCRA
and SDWA, Congress sought to invoke the broad and flexible equity powers of the federal courts
in instances where hazardous wastes threatened human health." Id. at 211 (citing Amending
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, S. Rep. No. 96-172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979)). 'The expen-
sive language of [RCRA Section 7003] was intended to confer 'overriding authority to respond to
situations involving a substantial endangerment to health or the environment.'" Id. at 213
(quoting Hazardous Waste Disposal, H.R. Committee Print No. 96-IFC, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1979)). Moreover, the court stated that "[c]ourts should not undermine the will of Congress by
either withholding relief or granting it grudgingly." Id.
89. The court quoted Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 320 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), which concluded that
"[a]lthough courts are rarely called upon to issue mandatory injunctions calling for the payment
of moneys pendente lite, they have done so when the equities and the circumstances of the case
demonstrated the appropriateness of the remedy." Price, 688 F.2d at 213.
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ing such payments to those situations where payments are needed to
abate a continuing endangerment or where payments are needed to
reimburse the EPA for action it took to abate the endangerment after
the initiation of the lawsuit.90
In contrast to this explicit restriction in Price, the Eighth
Circuit, in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co., Inc. ('7VEPACCO"),91 seemed to extend the authority to order
monetary payments under Section 7003 to cases where the threat to
public health and the environment has been eliminated prior the
filing of the lawsuit. In 1971, NEPACCO arranged for the disposal of
eighty-five drums of highly toxic hazardous waste. 92 The waste was
disposed of improperly, resulting in dangerously high levels of waste
in the surrounding soil and water.93 Through an anonymous tip, the
EPA became aware of the contaminated disposal site and took action
to remediate the problem. Having successfully contained the threat,
the EPA sought to recover its abatement costs from NEPACCO and
certain other defendants under RCRA Section 7003.94 The district
court rejected the request for relief on the grounds that the EPA had
failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted negligently.9 5 As a
result, the district court never considered whether Section 7003
authorizes the EPA to recover costs expended to abate wholly past
endangerments.9 6
The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's
decision, holding that RCRA applies to non-negligent off-site genera-
tors and transporters. 97 The court concluded that the district court
90. Id. at 212, 214.
91. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 730.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 731, 738. The court relied upon the decisions in United States v. Waste
Industries, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1308 (E.D.N.C. 1982), reversed, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984)
and United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Both cases were later over-
ruled by Congress as inconsistent with the intend of RCRA. See note 97.
96. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 738.
97. Id. at 741-42. The district court filed its decision in January 1984 and therefore did
not have the benefit of utilizing the 1984 Amendments to RCRA. Id. at 731. The House confer-
ence report to those Amendments specifically overruled the district court's decision as well as
the cases upon which the court based its decision. Specifically, the Report states:
Section 7003 focuses on the abatement of conditions threatening health and the envi-
ronment and not particularly human activity. Therefore, it has always reached those
persons who have contributed in the past or are presently contributing to the endan-
germent, including but not limited to generators, regardless of fault or negli-
gence.... The amendment reflects the longstanding view that generators and other
persons involved in the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or other disposal of
hazardous wastes must share in the responsibility for the abatement of the hazards
arising from their activities. The section was intended and is intended to abate condi-
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was free on remand to award response costs to the government as a
matter of equity.98 The court did not explain the legal basis for its
decision but simply assumed that RCRA does in fact authorize such a
remedy.
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the ability of the EPA to recover
restitutionary damages under RCRA Section 7003 in United States v.
Aceto Agr. Chemicals Corp.99 There, the EPA and the State of Iowa
spent over ten million dollars cleaning up a pesticide plant thoroughly
contaminated with hazardous waste. 00  After neutralizing the
environmental threat, the government sought to recover its abate-
ment costs from eight pesticide manufacturers who had conducted
business with the plant.101 The defendants responded that, because
the site had already been cleaned up, it no longer posed an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" as required by RCRA Section 7003.102
The court rejected this reasoning, concluding that the endangerment
need only be imminent and substantial at the time of the cleanup, not
at the time the suit is filed. 0 3 Indeed, the court went so far as to state
that requiring the EPA to file its RCRA action while the endanger-
ment exists would be an "absurd and unnecessary" requirement in a
reimbursement action.104 The court, therefore, concluded that the
tions resulting from past activities. Hence, the district court decisions in Wade, 546 F.
Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1301
(E.D.N.C. 1982), and United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), which restricted the application of section 7003,
are inconsistent with the authority conferred by the section as initially enacted and with
these clarifying amendments.
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-1133, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 119 (1984).
98. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 750. The court's holding, however, does not seem entirely
consistent with the cases it cites. The EPA's costs had already been expended and there was no
continuing environmental threat, a requirement the court itself seemed to acknowledge was
essential to the application of RCRA. For example, the court cited Price on a number of
occasions, and even concluded that RCRA only "imposes liability for the present and future
conditions resulting from past acts." Id. at 741 (emphasis in original). Despite this apparent
inconsistency, the court concluded that the EPA could recover its abatement costs associated
with an environmental threat which had ceased to exist as of the time of the trial. The court
seemed motivated to reach this conclusion by the fact that not all of the government's costs
could be recovered under CERCLA.
99. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 1375.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1383.
103. Id. CWe agree with the district court, however, that RCRA's 'imminent and substan-
tial endangermene language does not require the EPA to file and prosecute its RCRA action
while the endangerment exists").
104. Id. (concluding that "[the endangerment language is plainly intended by Congress to
limit the reach of RCRA to sites where the potential for harm is greae'). The court based its de-
cision in part on the fact that "like CERCLA, RCRA is a remedial statute, which should be liber-
ally construed." Id. at 1383 (citing Price, 688 F.2d at 211, 213-14).
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government was eligible to recover its environmental response costs,
even though the hazard had been eliminated by the time the govern-
ment filed suit against the defendants. 10 5
Price, NEPACCO, and Aceto demonstrate the trend towards
relaxing the requirements of RCRA's EPA imminent hazard
provision. 106 Recovery of abatement costs was initially restricted to
very narrow circumstances, requiring the presence of a continuing
endangerment. However, recovery of such costs eventually came to be
seen by many courts as an appropriate form of relief under Section
7003, despite the absence of a continuing endangerment. One might
think that this relaxation of the EPA's imminent hazard provision
would bode well for private citizens seeking to recover their abate-
ment costs under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B). However, this has not
proven to be the case.
C. Private Citizen Imminent Hazard Authority Under Section
7002(a)(1)(B)
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision, Section 7002(a)(1)(B),
closely parallels the EPA's imminent hazard authority, Section 7003.
Indeed, Section 7002(a)(1)(B) essentially extends the authority origi-
nally given to the EPA to sue to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment to "any person."1'0 RCRA's legislative history indicates
that Congress intended liability under the two sections to be identi-
cal.'08 In practice, however, courts have given a broader choice of
remedies to the government than they have given to ordinary citizens.
Specifically, while a number of courts have allowed the Administrator
105. The EPA specifically alleged that "all eight defendants are liable for the response costs
incurred at the Aidex site pursuant to RCRA [section 7003]." Id. at 1376. The court held that
the "plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to withstand defendants' motion to dismiss under both
CERCLA and RCRA." Id. On remand, therefore, the plaintiffs were authorized to seek the
recovery of their response costs. Id.
106. Recently, a Wyoming district court took the cases one step further, granting private
citizens a private right of contribution pursuant to § 7003. United States v. Valentine, 856 F.
Supp. 627, 632.33 (D. Wyo. 1994).
107. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 972(a)(1)(B). RCRA's imminent citizen suit provi-
sion provides that any person may file suit, "against any person.., including any past or pre-
sent generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Id.
(emphasis added).
108. See note 78.
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of the EPA to recover restitutionary damages under Section 7003,109
most have been extremely reluctant to extend a similar right to pri-
vate citizens under Section 7002(a)(1)(B).11O
1. Early District Court Decisions
The first case to squarely address the issue of restitutionary
damages in the context of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) was Commerce
Holding Co. v. Buckstone."' Commerce Holding owned a large indus-
trial park and leased a portion of the property to the defendants.
Upon investigation, the EPA discovered that the defendants' activities
had seriously contaminated the property with hazardous waste. 12
Realizing that it could be held jointly and severally liable as a
"potential responsible party" under CERCLA,"' Commerce Holding
entered into a consent decree with the EPA and agreed to take certain
remedial steps to clean up the site."4 Commerce Holding then sued to
recover its abatement costs under both RCRA and CERCLA.1"5
Ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
court rejected the assertion that remediation costs could be recovered
under RCRA.116 The court first explained that RCRA's imminent citi-
zen suit provision, while authorizing injunctive relief, does not pro-
vide a private right of action for monetary damages." 7 This aspect of
the court's decision is relatively uncontroversial; no court has ever
held that monetary damages, as distinguished from equitable restitu-
tion, are recoverable under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B).
The Commerce Holding court, however, went further, ruling
that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision does not authorize the
courts to award restitution in fashioning appropriate equitable re-
lief."8 In essence, the court concluded that because Commerce
109. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10130 (cited in note 14) (explaining that the "[flederal
courts have ruled that restitution of costs is an appropriate remedy under RCRA § 7003, EPA's
imminent hazard provision"). See Part III.B.
110. After the Supreme Coures recent decision in KFC, the scope of liability under § 7003
is unclear. Considering the explicit intent of Congress that liability is to be the same under §§
7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B), it would appear that Aceto and NEPACCO are no longer good law.
111. 749 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
112. Id. at 442.
113. Id. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (imposing joint and several liabil-
ity on the current owners and operators of a contaminated site).
114. Commerce Holding, 749 F. Supp. at 442.
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id. at 445-46.
117. Id. at 445.
118. Id. (concluding that "regardless of how the request is denominated, it does not comport
with the statute's purpose of allowing private parties to bring suit 'genuinely acting as private
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Holding would be the "direct beneficiary of the substantive relief," 119 it
was not acting as a private attorney general on behalf of the general
public. Importantly, the court chose to rely on prior case law inter-
preting RCRA's enforcement citizen suit provision, now codified in
Section 7002(a)(1)(A), rather than relying on the line of cases explain-
ing the scope of the EPA's imminent hazard authority under Section
7003.120
Following Commerce Holding, federal district courts have
consistently denied private parties the right to recover their environ-
mental response costs under RCRA's imminent citizen suit provi-
sion.121 Many of these courts reached such a conclusion on the basis
that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision does not authorize relief
for wholly past endangerments. 122
2. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig
The Ninth Circuit, in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig,123 rejected
the approach of Commerce Holding and its progeny, concluding that
attorneys general rather than pursuing a private remedy"' (quoting Lamphier, 714 F.2d at
337)).
119. Id. at 445.
120. Specifically, the court relied upon Walls, 761 F.2d at 311 and Lamphier, 714 F.2d at
331. Commerce Holding, 749 F. Supp. at 445. However, neither Walls or Lamphier considered
the 1984 Amendments to RCRA. The 1984 Amendments created an entirely new type of citizen
suit provision, the "imminent" suit provision. Despite the desire of Congress to impose the same
standard of liability under § 7002(a)(1)(B) as § 7003, the court apparently did not consider the
Price/NEPACCO/Aceto line of cases.
121. This has been true regardless of how plaintiffs characterized the relief sought. For
example, in an attempt to avoid the prohibition against monetary damages, the plaintiffs in
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. BMA Apts. Assocs., asked for an injunc-
tion ordering the defendant to pay the costs incurred in cleaning up a contaminated site. 847 F.
Supp. at 380. The court was not persuaded, ruling that "the prayer for injunctive relief is, in
actuality, a prayer for past and present money damages. 'A plaintiff cannot transform a claim
for damages into an equitable action by asking for an injunction that orders the payment of
money."' Id. at 385 (quoting Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979)). The
court further concluded that "because the availability of a legal remedy [such as money dam-
ages] often indicates that an applicant's injury is not irreparable, courts generally do not issue
injunctions to protect legal remedies." Id. at 385 (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262,
265 (5th Cir. 1993)).
122. For example, in Gache, the district court explained that RCRA does not authorize
relief for "wholly past violations." 813 F. Supp. at 1041. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that a defendants past or present acts constitute a continuing endangerment. Id. Additionally,
in Kaufman, the court, though acknowledging the Price/NEPACCO/Aceto line of cases, agreed
with the court in Gache that RCRA requires a continuing endangerment and that RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision does not provide plaintiffs a private remedy for damages or
restitution. 822 F. Supp. at 1476-77. The courts in Fallowfield Development Corp. v. Strunk,
Envir. Rptr. Cases (BNA) 1076, 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1993), Portsmouth Redevelopment, 847 F. Supp.
at 385, and Triffler v. Hopf, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16158, *14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1994) all
reached conclusions similar to those reached in Commerce Holding, Gache and Kaufman.
123. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995).
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RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) allows plaintiffs to recover the costs asso-
ciated with the cleanup of solid or hazardous waste on their prop-
erty.124 The dispute in KFC originated in September 1975 when Alan
and Margaret Meghrig sold a parcel of land to KFC. KFC then pro-
ceeded to operate a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise on the prop-
erty. In October 1988, KFC discovered in the process of improving the
property that underground storage tanks previously located on the
property had leaked, contaminating the surrounding soil with
gasoline.125 The City of Los Angeles Department of Building and
Safety subsequently issued a "corrective notice" ordering KFC to stop
construction pending a soil analysis and clearance from the County of
Los Angeles Department of Health Services.126 KFC conducted such
an analysis and proceeded to remediate the property at a cost of more
than $211,000.127 When the Meghrigs refused to reimburse KFC for
the cleanup costs, KFC filed suit.
At trial, KFC sought to recover its cleanup costs under RCRA
Section 7002(a)(1)(B). 128 KFC alleged that it was unaware the under-
lying soil was contaminated when it bought the property, and further
claimed that the storage tanks had leaked due to the Meghrigs'
negligence.129 The Meghrigs moved to dismiss the claim on the
grounds that the site did not present an imminent hazard because
KFC had already cleaned up the property, and that RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B) does not authorize the recovery of environmental
response costs. 1 0 The district court granted the Meghrigs's motion to
dismiss on both grounds. 131
The Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, reversed both of the
district court's holdings, allowing KFC to recover its cleanup costs
from the Meghrigs. The court first addressed the "imminent and
substantial endangerment" requirement of RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B). The court chose to follow the Eighth Circuit's interpre-
tation in Aceto of the phrase "imminent and substantial endanger-
124. Id. at 521.
125. Id. at 519.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The plaintiffs here did not file suit under CERCLA because petroleum is specifi-
cally excluded from the definition of a hazardous substance in that statute. See CERCLA §
101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). See also note 14 and accompanying text.
129. KFC, 49 F.3d at 519.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 519-20 (explaining that RCRA's citizen suit provision only authorizes "injunctive
or other equitable relief and only in cases involving an existing, imminent danger to public
health or the environmenf').
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ment." 132 In Aceto, the Eighth Circuit concluded that RCRA Section
7003, the source of the EPA's imminent hazard authority, does not
require the presence of a continuing endangerment.133  Having
adopted Aceto's interpretation of RCRA's "imminent and substantial
endangerment" requirement in Section 7003, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that KFC could recover its remediation costs under Section
7002(a)(1)(B) despite the fact that the site no longer presented an
imminent hazard.134
The Ninth Circuit in KFC next considered the issue of a proper
remedy, holding that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision author-
izes a court to award equitable restitution, including the recovery of
environmental response costs. 3 5 The court explained that such relief
could be granted under the statutory provision allowing a court to
order "such other action as may be necessary."' 3 6  While conceding
that no court had ever granted restitutionary relief to a private citizen
under Section 7002(a)(1)(B), the Ninth Circuit noted that a restitu-
tionary remedy had been awarded to the EPA under Section 7003.137
Having concluded that Congress intended to apply the same stan-
dards of liability to citizen and governmental imminent hazard
suits,1 38 the court reasoned that private citizens should have a right to
recover environmental response costs identical to the right courts had
given the EPA.139
132. Id. at 521.
133. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383. The court read the imminent hazard requirement as restrict-
ing the application of RCRA to sites with great potential for harm rather than requiring the
presence of an imminent hazard at the time the suit is filed. Id. See notes 99-105 and accom-
panying text.
134. KFC, 49 F.3d at 521.
135. Id. at 521-22.
136. Id. at 521. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), provides in relevant part that "[t]he
district court shall have jurisdiction ... to restrain any person who has contributed or who is
contributing to [an imminent and substantial endangerment], to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary, or both."
137. KFC, 49 F.3d at 521-22. In support of this conclusion, the court cited the three cases
discussed in Part III.B. The court first noted that the Eighth Circuit in Aceto allowed the
Administrator to recover its response costs after the government cleaned up the property. Id. at
522 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383). Next, the KFC court cited NEPACCO in which the Eighth
Circuit allowed the Administrator to collect remediation costs from those contributing to the
environmental endangerment. Id. at 522 (citing NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 741). Finally, the court
noted that the Third Circuit had held that "[r]eimbursement could ... be directed against those
parties ultimately found to be liable," even though the EPA had already funded a study of the
contaminated property. Id. at 522 (quoting Price, 688 F.2d at 214).
138. Id. at 521 n.3 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (1984) (cited in note 31)). See note 78.
139. According to the court in KFC, "[tihe legislative history for the 1984 RCRA
Amendments suggests that when Congress added the endangerment provision it did not intend
to grant a narrower right of action to citizens than to the Administrator, who is author-
ized... to bring reimbursement actions." 49 F.3d at 521 n.3.
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The Ninth Circuit's ruling in KFC undoubtedly expanded the
scope of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B). As one would anticipate, not all
courts were as willing as the Ninth Circuit to liberalize RCRA's im-
minent citizen suit provision.
3. The Eighth Circuit's Decision in Furrer v. Brown
Refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit's lead, the Eighth Circuit
in Furrer v. Brown140 found the analysis of Commerce Holding and its
progeny persuasive and, therefore, rejected the notion that plaintiffs
may recover their response costs under RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision.141 Decided only five months after KFC, Furrer concerns
remarkably similar facts. Richard and Margaret Furrer became
aware in 1991 that leaking underground storage tanks on their
property had previously contaminated the surrounding soil with
gasoline. 4 2 Upon investigation, the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources ordered the Furrers to clean up the site. 4 3  Like the
plaintiff in KFG, the Furrers removed the waste petroleum as ordered
and then sued to recover their response costs pursuant to RCRA
Section 7002(a)(1)(B). The Furrers claimed that the contamination
resulted from the prior owner's negligent operation of a gas station on
the property and that those owners ought to be ultimately responsible
for the cost of cleaning up the site.'" The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that
RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not authorize monetary relief.145
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in a split decision, concluding that
Congress did not intend to provide private citizens a mechanism to
recover their environmental cleanup costs. 46  Noting that RCRA
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not explicitly grant a restitutionary
remedy, the court reasoned that environmental response costs could
only be awarded if Congress intended to create such a right by impli-
cation when it authorized the federal courts to order "such other
action as may be necessary."147 To determine whether Congress in-
140. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 1101.
142. Id. at 1093.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Although the issue was before the court, Judge Bowman declined to address the
question of whether the "imminent and substantial endangermen' provision requires the envi-
ronmental threat to be a continuing one. Id. at 1095 n.6.
146. Id. at 1097.
147. Id. at 1094 (quoting RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)).
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tended to authorize the recovery of response costs under RCRA'simminent citizen suit provision, the court looked to the four factors
set out in Cort v. Ash.14
Placing the burden of proving that Congress intended to create
a restitutionary remedy on the plaintiff, the court first sought to de-
termine whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of citizens
such as the Furrers.149 The court in Furrer concluded that while "any
person" is entitled to sue under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B), the pro-
vision is designed for the benefit of the public at large, not for the
"special benefit" of those required to clean up contamination for which
they are not responsible. 50
Moreover, the court noted that an examination of other envi-
ronmental statutes indicates that Congress understands how to cre-
ate an express cause of action for the recovery of environmental
cleanup costs 51 and purposely declined to do so in RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision. 152 The court further reasoned that the failure of
Congress to include a private cause of action for citizens in RCRA's
underground storage tank provisions provides strong support for the
conclusion that RCRA was not designed to provide environmental
response costs to private parties. 153
148. Id. at 1094-95 ('The 'familiar tese of Cort v. Ash... sets out four factors relevant to
the search for an implied cause of action. First, we look at the statute to determine if the
Furrers are in the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and then at the legislative
history to see if it explicitly or implicitly shows an intent to create or deny the cause of action.
Third, we examine the proposed remedy in the context of the purpose of the statutory scheme,
and finally we consider whether the cause of action is one traditionally a matter of state law, so
that inferring a federal remedy would be inappropriate" (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975))). The Furrer court acknowledged that the four-part test of Cort v. Ash has been
interpreted as only providing a" 'guide to discerning' congressional intent." Id. at 1100 (quoting
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988)). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (concluding that "[the central inquiry remains whether Congress intended
to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action"). See generally notes 243-
45 and accompanying text.
149. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1095 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
150. Id. Instead, the court noted that "a persuasive argument can be made that the
Furrers are in a class of persons that RCRA and § [7002] are directed against-the owners of a
storage facility where hazardous waste has presented an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment." Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. Id. (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 n.11
(1981)).
152. Id.. As evidence of congressional know-how, the court pointed out that not only did
Congress specifically authorize the recovery of response costs in other environmental legislation
such as CERCLA, Congress also authorized the EPA and the states to recover response costs
from a prior owner or operator "with respect to the release of petroleum" from an underground
storage tank. RCRA § 9003(h)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(b)(h)(6).
153. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,
93-94 (1981)).
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Second, the court examined RCRA's legislative history to de-
termine whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action
for response costs under Section 7002(a)(1)(B). 54 The court concluded
that the legislative history provided no evidence that Congress
intended to either create or prohibit such an action.155 Lacking
legislative guidance, the court was disinclined to create a
restitutionary remedy, noting that congressional silence is shaky
ground on which to build an implied private right of action. 56
Third, the court examined the proposed remedy in the context
of RCRA's stated purpose.157 The legislative history of RCRA makes
clear that the primary goal of RCRA's citizen suit provision is the
"prompt abatement of imminent and substantial endangerments.' 58
In light of this objective, the court found that awarding cleanup costs
is unnecessary to effectuate the congressional purpose of the provi-
sion, indicating that Congress did not intend to authorize a private
cause of action.159 The court noted that the Furrers were properly
ordered by the appropriate state authorities to clean up the waste
petroleum on their property and they had little choice but to comply
with the order. 60 Because remediation was essentially inevitable, the
court reasoned that awarding the Furrers their response costs would
do little, if anything, to advance RCRA's objectives. According to the
court, the issue of awarding restitutionary damages only addresses
who must pay for a cleanup, not whether there will be a cleanup at
all.161
In addition, the court explained that RCRA's imminent citizen
suit provision was only intended to give citizens a "limited right.., to
sue to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment."62 For ex-
ample, RCRA's notice requirements 63 and prohibition against private
enforcement actions when the EPA or the state is diligently prosecut-
154. Id. at 1097. Although RCRA's legislative history does not expressly bar a cause of
action for equitable restitution, it does make clear on many occasions that the imminent hazard
provisions are designed to abate continuing endangerments. See Part IV.A.2. It would seem,
therefore, that a plaintiff could not recover environmental costs expended to remediate a wholly
past endangerment. In other words, the continuing endangerment requirement bars a court
from awarding response costs incurred prior to filing of the suit.
155. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1097.
156. Id. (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571).
157. Id. at 1099.
158. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31).
159. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1049 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 84).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1098 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31)).
163. RCRA § 7002(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A).
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ing" the matter 164 evinces a congressional intent to only authorize use
of the provision when the solid or hazardous waste continues to
threaten public health or the environment. 165
Finally, the court considered the fourth Cort factor, whether
inferring a federal remedy awarding response costs would inappropri-
ately encroach upon matters traditionally left to the states. 166 The
Furrer court concluded that although a federal private cause of action
to recover response costs would not constitute an infringement on
state sovereignty, lack of federal encroachment alone could not sup-
port the need to grant a monetary remedy.167
After examining each of the four guiding factors outlined in
Cort, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to
create a private cause of action for damages in RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision.168 In addition, the court stated that KFC's reli-
ance on NEPACCO and Aceto, two prior Eighth Circuit decisions, as
evidence that RCRA authorizes restitution was misplaced and inap-
propriate. 169 Further, having determined that Congress did not intend
to create a private cause of action for damages, the court held that the
Furrers were barred from recovering their response costs under
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision. 70
4. Resolution of the Circuit Court Split by the Supreme Court
In an effort to clarify the state of the law and to resolve the
split of authority between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.'7'
In a decision by Justice O'Connor, the Court unanimously reversed
the Ninth Circuit, concluding that RCRA's imminent citizen suit pro-
vision requires the existence of a continuing endangerment at the
time the lawsuit is filed and does not authorize the courts to grant the
recovery of response costs related to past endangerments.172 The
Court first explained that the existence of a cost recovery provision in
164. Id. § 7002(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B).
165. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1098.
166. Id. at 1099-1111.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1100.
169. Id. The court stated that NEPACCO and Aceto merely assumed, without specifically
deciding, that RCRA § 7003 authorizes the EPA to recover its remediation costs, and that, as a
result, the Furrer court concluded that the decisions had no precedential value as to that
particular issue. Id.
170. Id. at 1101-02.
171. 116 S. Ct. 41, 132 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1995).
172. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955, *9-10 (Mar. 19, 1996).
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CERCLA, combined with the failure to include a similar provision in
RCRA, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide citizens
a private right of action to recover cleanup costs under RCRA's citizen
suit provision.173 The Court was also persuaded that RCRA requires a
continuing endangerment at the time of trial based on the language,
structure and context of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B). 74 The Court,
however, expressly declined to address the issue of whether citizen-
plaintiffs may recover cleanup costs expended after initiation of the
lawsuit.175 As Part IV of this Note explains, this avenue appears to be
a promising one for those interested in using RCRA's imminent citi-
zen suit provision.
IV. ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF SECTION 7002(a)(1)(B)
The broad concern posed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., is whether RCRXs imminent citizen
suit provision authorizes private parties to recover from those at fault
reasonable costs expended to abate an imminent hazard. Resolution
of this question is further broken down into two discrete issues. 7 6
First, whether the "imminent and substantial endangerment" re-
quirement of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) may be satisfied by examin-
ing the nature of the threat at the time the site is cleaned up rather
than at the time the lawsuit is filed.' 7 In essence, this question re-
173. Id. at *15 (concluding the comprehensive scheme of hazardous waste regulation
"amply demonstrate[s] that Congress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake
a cleanup and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA").
174. Specifically, the Court noted that the phrase "may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment" indicates that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision "was designed to
provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future 'imminent' harms, not a
remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts." Id. at *11-12. In addition, the Court pointed
to the lack of a statute of limitations and inclusion of a notice requirement as indicating a need
for an endangerment at the commencement of the litigation. Id. at * 12-13.
175. Id. at *15-16.
176. The two questions, however, are not entirely distinct; they intertwine and overlap.
For example, should a court find that RCRA!s imminent citizen suit provision requires a con-
tinuing endangerment, then a plaintiff could not hope to recover costs expended on a hazardous
waste site which no longer presents an imminent and substantial threat. Rather the plaintiff
would be forced to sue before initiating abatement procedures. Conversely, if the best a plaintiff
can hope for is to receive a mandatory or prohibitory injunction, then the environmental endan-
germent must of necessity be a continuing one. Where the threat from the waste has been
eliminated and restitutionary damages are not available, there would be no action for a court to
order and the complaint would essentially be moot. See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc.,
881 F. Supp. 1237, 1248 n.8 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (hypothesizing that in circumstances where "only
injunctive relief is available to the plaintiff and the hazard alleged has been abated, there may
not be a case or controversy present and the action may be moot").
177. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *8-9.
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quires a determination as to whether RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision requires a continuing endangerment. Second, whether the
statutory language of RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision' 78
authorizes the courts to order payment of plaintiffs' environmental
response costs. 179 The first issue essentially addresses one of the
three elements needed to prove a prima facie case under RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision. 180 The second relates to the type of
relief available to a plaintiff once the substantive case has been
proved. A determination that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision
requires the presence of a continuing endangerment, or that the
provision does not authorize the recovery of restitutionary damages,
will prevent citizen plaintiffs from recovering cleanup costs expended
to remediate wholly past endangerments.'5 '
Resolution of the two issues outlined above is essentially a
matter of statutory construction.8 2  The ultimate objective is to dis-
cern and adhere to the intent of Congress in adopting Section
7002(a)(1)(B), not to hypothesize as to how the provision could be
improved.83 Notably, however, RCRA, as a remedial statute, author-
178. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (empowering the district courts to order a defen-
dant "to take such other action as may be necessary").
179. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *9-10. Note that this may be further broken down into
two types of relief. Reimbursement for past response costs and payment of future response
costs. A conclusion that past response costs are not recoverable does not necessarily mandate a
determination that future response costs are not recoverable. Id. at *15-16.
180. See note 187 and accompanying text.
181. However, as explained in Part IV.B.2.b, RCRA may authorize the federal courts to
order payment of response costs expended after initiation of the lawsuit provided there is a con-
tinuing imminent and substantial endangerment at the time the suit is filed.
182. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (stating that "[t]he question of the existence of a
statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction"); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (concluding that a determination as to whether a violation of
federal law gives rise to a private cause of action requires "careful attention" to the issue of
statutory construction).
183. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578-79 (refusing to expand the statutory remedy despite the
fact that not doing so "sanctions injustice" on the grounds that the federal courts "are not at
liberty to legislate. If there is to be a federal damages remedy under these circumstances,
Congress must provide it. '[I]t is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area'"
(quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963))). See Hudson Distributors v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 377 U.S. 386, 395 (1964) (stating that "[w]hether it is good policy to permit such laws is a
matter for Congress to decide. Where the statutory language and the legislative history clearly
indicate the purpose of Congress that purpose must be upheld"); United States v. Gibbens, 25
F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that courts are to act as "interpreters of the words chosen by
Congress" rather than "policymakers or enlargers of congressional intene').
Indeed, the preference to defer to Congress grows stronger in those situations where an ex-
pansive judicial interpretation could disrupt a comprehensive regulatory scheme. As the Court
explained in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
[t]he choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the leg-
islative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative
bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing
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izes the courts to construe its provisions broadly to ensure that the
remedial nature of the statute is satisfied.18 The goal, of course, is to
construe RCRA's provisions broadly enough to satisfy the statute's
remedial purpose without creating causes of action never intended by
Congress. Although this line is rarely clear, the language, structure,
and context of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B), combined with an under-
standing of the comprehensive scheme of hazardous waste regulation,
indicates that Congress did not intend to extend application of
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision to wholly past endanger-
ments.
A. The Continuing Endangerment Requirement
Although RCRA has long authorized citizen suits as a private
enforcement mechanism, RCRA's citizen suit provision has undergone
substantial revisions. 185 Most recently, in 1984 Congress adopted
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) in order to provide citizens a private cause of
action to abate imminent and substantial endangerments. 186 RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision requires plaintiffs to prove: (1) that
the substance in question qualifies as a solid or hazardous waste, (2)
that the defendant's past or present activities contributed to handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of the waste, and (3)
values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected represen-
tatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed
to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to
the courts.
447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). See also Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646-47 ('The range of factors to
be weighed in deciding whether a right to contribution should exist demonstrates the inappro-
priateness of judicial resolution of this complex issue. Ascertaining what is 'fair' in this setting
calls for the inquiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the elements of a par-
ticular case or category of cases"); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94 (concluding that it is be.
yond the competence of the federal courts to "amend these comprehensive enforcement schemes
by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by Congress").
184. See KFC, 49 F.3d at 521 (observing that "RCRA's purpose is to give broad authority to
the courts to grant all relief necessary to ensure complete protection of the public health and the
environment' (citations omitted)); Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383 (concluding that "like CERCLA,
RCRA is a remedial statute, which should be liberally construed"); Price, 688 F.2d at 214
(stating that "Congress, in the endangerment provisions of RCRA and SDWA sought to invoke
nothing less than the full equity powers of the federal courts in the effort to protect public
health, the environment, and public water supplies from the pernicious effects of toxic wastes.
Courts should not undermine the will of Congress by either withholding relief or granting it
grudgingly"); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (explaining that the legislative history of RCRA indicates "Congress' clear intent to give
broad authority to the courts to grant all relief necessary to ensure complete protection of public
health and the environment'); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1108-10 (D. Minn. 1982).
185. See note 8 and accompanying text.
186. See notes 46 and 50 and accompanying text.
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that the waste may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment. 87 While the first two requirements have occasionally spawned
litigation, controversy has centered primarily around the meaning
and scope of RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment re-
quirement.
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision is unique among envi-
ronmental citizen suit provisions in at least two respects. First, it
imposes liability for both past and present behavior. Most environ-
mental citizen suit provisions only impose liability for continuing or
intermittent acts. 188 Second, RCRA is the only environmental statute
that authorizes the public at large to sue those who have contributed
to an imminent and substantial endangerment. 189 When combined,
these two aspects of RCRA's citizen suit provision unquestionably
impose liability for past acts which continue to present an imminent
hazard.
The question posed by the split between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, and ultimately by the Supreme Court's decision in KFC, is
whether RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision goes further, impos-
ing liability for past activities which no longer present a threat to
health or the environment. The language, structure and context of
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) strongly supports the Court's conclusion that
Congress intended to limit liability to those waste sites which present
a continuing environmental endangerment at the time the lawsuit is
filed.
1. Interpreting RCRA's Imminent Citizen Suit Provision
As the Supreme Court has made clear on numerous occasions,
the first step of statutory interpretation is to examine the language of
the statute. 190 The plain language of RCRA's imminent citizen suit
187. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10128 (cited in note 14).
188. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (holding that those citizen suit provisions which provide a cause of action when a person
is "alleged to be in violation" of the statute's regulations, including the Clean Air and Water
Acts, require that "citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuing or intermittent viola-
tion"). It is important to distinguish, however, between a continuing act and a continuing en-
dangerment. While RCRA applies to wholly past acts, it does not apply to wholly past endan-
germents.
189. Babich, Environmental Public Nuisance, in Environmental Litigation at 987 (cited in
note 8). Miller, Citizen Suits at 2 n.5 (cited in note 25) (noting that RCRA "was the first and
remains the only statute" to contain an imminent citizen suit provision).
190. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989) (stating that "the starting point
for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself'). For examples of cases using
similar language, see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56; Consumer Product Safety Commn v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688; Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
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provision provides needed guidance as to the intent of Congress in
adopting the provisions. 191 Under Section 7002(a)(1)(B), liability is
imposed only when a solid or hazardous waste "may present" an
imminent hazard. The phrase "may present" modifies "imminent and
substantial endangerment" and strongly indicates that Congress only
envisioned liability in those circumstances where the solid or hazard-
ous waste continues to threaten the public health or the environment
at the time the lawsuit is filed.192
Not all courts, however, have concluded that RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B) unambiguously requires a continuing endangerment.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in KFC held that RCRA's imminent
citizen suit provision does not specifically state whether the waste
must constitute an imminent endangerment at the time the suit is
filed or at the time the cleanup begins. Finding RORA's imminent
citizen suit ambiguous,193 the Ninth Circuit in KFC chose to read the
imminent hazard requirement as identifying the nature of the threat
rather than as limiting the time in which the suit must be brought.
However, as the Supreme Court has previously noted, the
mere presence of ambiguity does not make every interpretation
equally plausible. 194 While it may be impossible to state with absolute
certainty on the basis of the language of Section 7002 alone that
Congress intended to limit RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision
strictly to continuing endangerments, the statutory evidence indicates
that Congress did, in fact, intend such a limitation.195 As the Supreme
551, 558 (1979); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
191. The term "imminene' is defined variously as "near at hand," "impending," threatening"
and "perilous." Black's Law Dictionary 750 (West, 6th ed. 1990). Admittedly, these definitions
by themselves do not resolve the question as to when the situation must be "impending" or
"threatening." However, to argue that the RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision extends to
those situations where the threat was "near at hand" or "impending" at some point in the past
would be awkward and unnatural. Rather, the very use of the term seems to connote a sense of
continuing endangerment. See KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *11-12.
192. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 930 (1987) (defining the term "present'
as "a verb tense that is expressive of present time or the time of speaking").
193. Gibbens, 25 F.3d at 34 (defining a statute as ambiguous if "it can reasonably be read in
more than one way" (citing United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 297-98 (lst Cir. 1993))).
194. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57.
195. The statutory language of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) makes clear that the provision applies
to past acts. However, even if this were not the case, some courts have held that the term
"disposal" includes passive conduct such as leaking and is not restricted to purely active human
conduct. See City of Toledo, 833 F. Supp. at 656 (holding that "the disposal of wastes can
constitute a continuing violation as long as no proper disposal procedures are put into effect or
as long as the waste has not been cleaned up and the environmental effects remain remedi-
able"); Gache, 813 F. Supp. at 1041 (concluding that "[improperly discharged wastes which
continue to exist unremediated represent a continuing violation of RCRA.... The continued
presence of illegally dumped waste on plaintiffs property could constitute a continuing violation
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Court's decision in KFC makes clear, the statutory evidence support-
ing such a conclusion includes the provision's use of the past and
present tense,196 lack of a statute of limitations, 197 and inclusion of a
notice requirement. 198
a. Linguistic Analysis
First, and perhaps most importantly, the use of both the past
and present tenses when describing the behavior that may trigger
liability under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B), combined with the use of
only a present tense verb when describing the type of endangerment
required, indicates a desire by Congress to limit the provision to those
cases where the solid or hazardous waste constitutes a continuing
environmental threat.199 Congress limited application of Section
7002(a)(1)(B) to those cases where the waste "may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment."200 If Congress had intended to
broaden the scope of liability to include wholly past endangerments, it
could have simply continued its practice of including both possibilities
by stating that the provision applies to those situations in which the
solid or hazardous waste "may present or may have presented" an
imminent hazard. 20' The distinction is especially striking because
of RCRA... So long as wastes remain in the landfill threatening to leach into the surrounding
soil and water, a continuing violation surely may exist'). Fallowfield Development, 1990 U.S.
Dist. 4820 at *35 (concluding that violations "continue to occur simply by allowing the improp-
erly disposed of hazardous waste to remain on the property"); Acme, 812 F. Supp. at 1498
(concluding that "leaking of hazardous substances may constitute a continuing or intermittent
violation of RCRA"); Waste Industries, 734 F.2d at 164 (concluding that "[t]he term 'disposal,' it
is true, is used throughout subtitle C in the sense that the Administrator can regulate current
disposal of hazardous waste. In this way, the Act regulates current conduct of would-be pollut-
ers. But a strained reading of that term limiting its § 7003 meaning to active conduct would so
frustrate the remedial purpose of the Act as to make it meaningless. Section 7003, unlike the
provisions of the Act's subtitle C, does not regulate conduct but regulates and mitigates
endangerments"); Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1071 (holding that "[b]y [Section 7003's] plain language,
the statute authorizes relief restraining further disposal, i.e., leaking, of hazardous wastes from
the landfill into the groundwaters .... [This] disposal need not result from affirmative action
by the defendants but may be the result of passive inaction" (citations omitted)).
196. See Part IV.A. .a.
197. See Part IV.Al.b.
198. See Part IV.Al.c.
199. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *11-12.
200. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
201. See KFC, 49 F.3d at 525 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (concluding that RCRA's unambigu-
ous language requires that the endangerment must be occurring at the time of filing suit. Only
if the statute had read 'may or may have presented' would it have implied that § [7002(a)(1)(B)]
permits reimbursement actions for an endangerment that someone had already cleaned up"
(emphasis added)). The history of § 7002 further supports this conclusion. Prior to the 1984
Amendments to RCRA, some courts had limited the provision to continuing or intermittent acts.
Congress sought to overrule these cases by inserting both the past and present tenses into §
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Congress demonstrated elsewhere its familiarity with the importance
of the past/present tense distinction. Congress used the phrase "past
or present" four separate times when describing the type of behavior
covered by the provision. Specifically, RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision provides a cause of action against "any past or present
generator, or past or present transporter, or past or present owner or
operator.., who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of
any solid or hazardous waste."2 02 Congress consciously limited
application of Section 7002(a)(1)(B) to past or present acts that
currently continue to present an environmental endangerment.203
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the language of Section
7002(a)(1)(B) extends liability only to those cases in which there is a
continuing endangerment is further supported by the Court's reading
of a similar statute in Gwaltney.24 The Court in Gwaltney addressed
the question of whether the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") applies to past, as well as continuing, activities. CWA's
citizen suit provision,2 5 which parallels RCRA's enforcement citizen
suit provision,206 provides a private cause of action against persons
"alleged to be in violation" of CWA's requirements. The Court held
that the phrase "to be in violation" clearly requires that a plaintiff
allege a reasonable likelihood that the polluter will continue to violate
the requirements of CWA.207 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
found that the sole use of the present tense throughout CWA Section
505 was strong indication of the "prospective orientation" of the
citizen suit provision.2 08
7002. See note 97. Importantly, Congress only inserted both tenses when discussing the
activities, not the endangerments covered by the provision.
202. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
203. Justice Scalia made this point at oral argument: 'My point is there is no ambiguity,
not if you're speaking English. May exist or may have existed is the meaning you say may exist
conveys. It does not convey that meaning." Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1996 WL 14515, *41
(Jan. 10, 1996) (transcripts of oral argument).
204. 484 U.S. at 49.
205. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), authorizes citizens to file suit
[A]gainst any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter, or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation ....
206. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). See generally note 44.
207. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57.
208. Id. at 59. The Court cited a number of examples of the extensive use of the present
tense. Specifically, the Court noted:
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Although RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) involves a different form
of citizen suit than CWA Section 505(a), RCRA's use of the present
and past tenses is equally telling. First, Gwaltney's conclusion that
CWA Section 505 requires a continuing act because Congress defined
the type of activity regulated by the provision only in the present
tense supports the conclusion that RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision requires a continuing endangerment because Congress
defined the type of endangerment regulated by Section 7002(a)(1)(B)
only in the present tense. Second, RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision demonstrates that Congress acknowledged the importance
of using the past tense when imposing liability for past acts. If
Congress wanted to include past endangerments in the scope of theimminent citizen suit provision, there is every reason to believe that it
would have again used the past tense to describe the type of endan-
germents governed by the provision. The selective use of the past
tense combined with the importance of the past/present tense distinc-
tion indicates that Congress consciously chose not to expand RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision to include wholly past endanger-
ments. 09
A citizen suit may be brought only for violation of a permit limitation "which is in effect'
under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(. Citizen-plaintiffs must give notice to the alleged
violator, the Administrator of EPA, and the State in which the violation "occurs." §
1365(b)(1)(A) .... The most telling use of the present tense is in the definition of
"citizen" as "a person.., having an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by
the defendant's violations of the Act. § 1365(g). This definition makes plain what the
undeviating use of the present tense strongly suggest: the harm sought to be addressed
by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the past.
Id. Indeed, the Court in Gwaltney found that the use of the past and present tenses in RCRA §
7002 demonstrates that Congress "knows how to avoid this prospective implication by using
language that explicitly targets wholly past violations." Id. at 57.
209. Some have blasted the Court for its narrow interpretation of CWA's citizen suit
provision in Gwaltney. One of the most scathing critiques came from Professor Rodgers:
The opinion in Gwaltney combines poor lawyering with unconvincing semantics and bad
history. The poor lawyering is the Court's failure to explain the role of civil penalties
that have long been available in citizen suits under the Clean Water Act. This kind of
backwards-looking or punitive relief is at odds with the Court's vision of forward-looking
or injunctive relief. The semantical point has to do with the meaning of "in violation."
One who commits a homicide surely remains "in violation" of the law of society after the
weapon is put aside. What is it about environmental offenses that prompts lawyers to
consider the matter over and done with (the wrong is "wholly past') once there is some
brief discontinuation of conduct? The piece of history concerns the origins of the past-
and-present-tense-distinction in the environmental laws. In Gwaltney, the Supreme
Court was moved by the intelligence that Section 7002 of RCRA is written clearly to ap-
ply to offenses "past or present." But the language was changed in 1984 to overcome an
improvident interpretation of the Eastern District of North Carolina. By thus correcting
one statute the Congress is supposed to have deliberately unraveled a half dozen others.
By this subtle process the drafting paradigm is driven by the worse instincts of the poor-
est performing judge in the land.
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b. Lack of Statute of Limitations
In addition, RCRA's lack of a statute of limitations provides
support, though not necessarily conclusive support, for the conclusion
that Congress never intended to extend liability to wholly past endan-
germents under RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision.2 0 When
Congress has provided citizens a private right of action to recover
response costs in other environmental statutes, it has generally pro-
vided a corresponding statute of limitations. Indeed, the inclusion of
a limitations period in CERCLA,2 1 without a similar statute of limita-
tions for RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B), lends further support to the
conclusion that Congress only intended RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision as a means to abate continuing endangerments, not as a
mechanism to allocate financial responsibility for rehabilitated haz-
ardous waste sites. 212
However, the failure to include a specific statute of limitations
within RCRA is not decisive in itself. When Congress fails to provide
a statutory right of action with a specific statute of limitations, courts
generally apply the generic federal five year statute.213 Nevertheless,
With the returns rapidly coming in, Gwaltney must take its place as one of the
most destructive in a sorry series of Supreme Court opinions on environmental
law .... This unanimous decision shows the Court at its careless, deferential, and lit-
eral-minded worst-careless because of the enormous jockeying costs imposed across the
spectrum of citizen suits, deferential because the Court buys into restrictions invented
by federal agencies for their own convenience, and literal-minded because the
inadvertent use of the present tense in Section 505 is seized upon to restrict sharply the
reach of citizen suits.
Rodgers, Environmental Law § 4.3 at 289-90 (cited in note 5) (footnotes omitted).
However, these criticisms do not seem to apply to an interpretation of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B)
requiring the existence of a continuing endangerment at the time suit is filed. While it is pos-
sible that Congress had no intention of "unraveling" other environmental provisions by includ-
ing the past and present tenses in RCRA § 7002, one cannot overlook the importance of using
both tenses at least as it pertains to RCRA itself. Congress went out of its way to address
RCRA's present/past tense "problem," leaving the requirement that the solid or hazardous waste
"may present" an imminent hazard firmly in place.
210. See Harris Bank Hinsdale, N.A. v. Suburban Lawn, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19737,
*11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1992) (dismissing a claim due to the lack of a continuing endangerment at
the time of the suit).
211. CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
212. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *12-13. See also KFC, 49 F.3d at 526 (Brunetti, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that "the lack of a limitations period in RCRA in contrast to the limita-
tions period in CERCLA and the express authorization for recovery of response costs suggests
that Congress did not contemplate reimbursement actions in RCRA').
213. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10134 (cited in note 14) (citing Bodne v. Geo. A Rheman
Co., Inc., 811 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D.S.C. 1993) (concluding that the generic "five-year statute of
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 probably applies to citizen RCRA imminent hazard actions").
See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
the relevant statute of limitation for citizen suits brought under the Clean Water Act is the ge-
neric federal statute of limitations, rather than an analogous state statute of limitations, in or-
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this observation misses the point. Admittedly, if Congress truly in-
tended to create a private right of action for restitution in RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision, then the generic five year statute of
limitations would probably apply. However, the fact that Congress
did not include a statute of limitations in RCRA, combined with the
fact that Congress has included such a limitations period in other
environmental statutes that provide for the recovery of environmental
response costs, indicates that RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) was never
truly envisioned as a mechanism to provide a remedy for wholly past
endangerments.
c. Inclusion of a Notice Requirement
Finally, the Court's conclusion that RCRA's imminent citizen
suit provision requires a continuing endangerment is further sup-
ported by the inclusion of a mandatory notice requirement. 214 RCRA
Section 7002(b)(2)(A) specifies that a private citizen suing under
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision must give the Administrator,
the State, and the defendant ninety days' notice before filing suit.215
Two basic reasons have been given for the notice requirement. 2'6
First, it gives the government the chance to bring the suit in lieu of
the private party.217 Second, it gives the plaintiff and the defendant
der to ensure national uniformity regarding the limitations periods as well as to ensure that
citizen plaintiffs are able to act as effective private attorneys general); Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Durrryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73-75 (3d Cir. 1990)
(same); Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1124-25 (D.C. Md. 1985)
(same), affirmed, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988).
214. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *13.
215. RCRA § 702(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A), provides that:
No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section prior to ninety
days after the plaintiff has given notice of the endangerment to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur; and
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or haz-
ardous waste referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, except that such action
may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this
section respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter.
216. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29. Given the plain language of RCRA's notice provisions and
the purposes served behind them, the Court held that "the notice and 60-day delay re-
quirements are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen
suit provision; a district court may not disregard these requirements at its discretion." Id. at 31.
217. Id. at 29 (holding that RCRA's notice provision "allows Government agencies to take
responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for citizen suits")
(citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60)). RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(i), provides
that a private party may not bring an imminent hazard suit where the Administrator of the
EPA "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action" under either RCRA § 7003, the
EPA's authority, or CERCLA § 106. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31) (stating
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
an opportunity to settle the matter before the adversarial process
becomes inevitable and irreversible.1 8 These reasons, however, only
hold true where there is a continuing endangerment.29 Citizen suits
are designed to ensure that a defendant complies with the appropri-
ate regulations without creating significant endangerments to health
or the environment. When a site no longer presents an imminent
endangerment, citizen suits are no longer needed.
In addition, where the solid or hazardous waste no longer
presents an imminent substantial endangerment, there does not ap-
pear to be any reason why the Administrator of the EPA or the state
would need notice of a pending suit. The majority in KFC stated that
the notice requirement would help the EPA and the states determine
whether the toxic waste site has been remediated and whether those
at fault were held responsible.220 In reality, however, the notice re-
quirement does little more than give the EPA notice that one party is
suing another. The notice provision by itself does not ensure that the
appropriate party is being sued or even that the environmental haz-
ard has been properly abated. Moreover, the EPA has little, if any,
interest in tracking how private parties allocate responsibility for the
remediation of wholly past environmental endangerments. Once the
environmental threat has been eliminated, there is simply nothing
left for the EPA or the state to do.
Although it is unclear whether the Court held that any one of
these three factors individually provides conclusive proof that Section
7002(a)(1)(B) applies only to continuing endangerments, collectively,
RCRA's careful use of the past and present tenses, failure to provide a
that citizen plaintiffs may only sue "if the Administrator (following notice of the intended
litigation) fails to file an action under 7003"). See also Miller, Citizen Suits at 44-45 (cited in
note 25) (concluding that "[t]he purpose behind the 60-day notice requirements is clearly to
enable and encourage the government to perform its enforcement role. The notice requirements
were adopted, in part, to counter those who opposed citizen suit provisions, purportedly fearing
that citizens would flood courts with suits and interfere with the proper enforcement role of the
executive branch").
218. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 (ruling that "notice gives the alleged violator 'an opportunity
to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a
citizen suit'" (quoting Gwaltney 484 U.S. at 60)). For a critique of the notice requirements on
environmental citizen suit provisions, see id. at 45-51.
219. As the Supreme Court explained in Gwaltney:
[Tihe purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself
into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen
suit. If we assume.., that citizen suits may target wholly past violations, the require-
ment of notice to the alleged violator becomes gratuitous. Indeed, respondents.., can
think of no reason for Congress to require such notice other than that "it seemed right"
to inform an alleged violator that it was about to be sued.
484 U.S. at 60.
220. KFC, 49 F.3d at 522.
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statute of limitations, and inclusion of a notice requirement, provide a
strong argument that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision was not
intended to impose liability for wholly past endangerments.
2. Deciphering RCRA's Legislative History
Not only does the statutory evidence support the conclusion
that Congress intended to limit application of RCRA's imminent citi-
zen suit provision to continuing endangerments, this determination is
further substantiated by the legislative history of RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B). 221 It should first be noted that RCRA is essentially a
221. Additional evidence indicating a congressional intent to limit RCRA's imminent haz-
ard authority is found in the legislative history of RCRA § 7003, the EPA's imminent hazard
provision. RCRA § 7003 is nearly identical to § 7002(a)(1)(B), except that § 7003 gives the
Administrator of the EPA the right to sue to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment
while § 7002(a)(1)(B) extends this authority to the public at large. The legislative history of §
7003 has important implications for § 7002(a)(1)(B) because Congress has declared that the
standards of liability under § 7002(a)(1)(B) are identical "to the standards of liability established
under § 7003." H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31). See note 78.
Evidence supporting the conclusion that RCRA's imminent hazard authority is limited to
abating continuing endangerments can be found in the legislative history of both the 1980 and
1984 RCRA Amendments. Interestingly, § 7003 was not even mentioned in the original
committee reports at the time the RCRA was adopted. In discussing the scope of the EPA's
imminent hazard authority, the committee report from the 1980 RCRA Amendments notes that
"imminence in [§ 7003] applies to the nature of the threat rather than identification of the time
when the endangerment initially arose. The Section, therefore, may be used for events which
took place at some time in the past but which continue to present a threat to the public health
or the environment." H.R. Committee Print No. 96-IFC 32 (cited in note 88).
Not only does the legislative history of the 1980 Amendments to § 7003 suggest the need for
a continuing endangerment, the House Conference Report concerning the 1984 Amendments
reinforces this conclusion. Specifically, the 1984 Report states:
Section 7003 focuses on the abatement of conditions threatening health and the envi-
ronment .... The amendment reflects the longstanding view that generators and other
persons involved in the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of haz-
ardous wastes must share in the responsibility for the abatement of the hazards arising
from their activities. The section was intended and is intended to abate conditions re-
sulting from past activities.
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, H.R. Conf Rep. No. 98-1133, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 119 (1984) (emphasis added). The report continues, explaining that "Section 7003 has
always provided the authority to require the abatement of present conditions of endangerment
resulting from past disposal practices, whether intentional or unintentional" and that "[tihese
amendments [to § 7003]... confirm that abatement authority vested in EPA and the courts
extends to both past and present acts contributing to an imminent and substantial
endangerment." H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 48 (cited in note 31) (emphasis added). Finally, the
House Report explains that "due to the nature of the hazards presented by disposal sites,
Section 7003 is 'intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable
relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risks posed by toxic wastes.' The section was
intended and is intended to abate conditions resulting from past activities." Id. (quoting Price,
688 F.2d at 213-14) (emphasis added). Together, these statements concerning the EPA's
"abatemene' authority strongly indicate that RCRA only applies where there is a continuing en-
dangerment.
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prospective regulatory regime.2 22 Congress designed RCRA to act as a
"cradle-to-grave regulatory regime,"2 3 with the intention that its pro-
visions would apply to those who handle, store, treat, or dispose of
any solid or hazardous waste at any point in the waste's lifetime.
Consistent with this approach, liability extends only to those situ-
ations where the waste continues to threaten public health or the
environment.
The legislative history of Section 7002(a)(1)(B) makes clear
that RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision was only intended to
apply to past or present acts which constitute a continuing endan-
germent to health or the environment. Although Section
7002(a)(1)(B) is more forgiving than many other environmental citizen
suit provisions in that it applies to past acts,224 and that it only re-
quires an imminent risk or threat of harm rather than actual harm,225
222. See note 11 and accompanying text.
223. See note 11.
224. Past activity may trigger liability under RCRA even though the particular conduct has
stopped and may never resume. Susan M. Cooke, 3 The Law of Hazardous Waste:
Management, Cleanup, Liability, and Litigation, § 15.01(3)(b) at 15-11 (Matthew Bender, 1995)
(explaining that although the law was originally unsettled, "the 1984 amendments made it clear
that past activities could trigger liability under Sections 7002 and 7003"). See also note 97.
225. The statute makes clear that an endangerment need not exist if there may be a threat
to health or the environment. The court in Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, explained the
statutory basis for this conclusion at length:
First, it is significant that the word "may" precedes the standard of liability: "[t]his is
'expansive language,' which is 'intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant
affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic
wastes."'...
Second, "endangerment" means a threatened or potential harm and does not re-
quire proof of actual harm .... When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual
injury need ever occur...
Third, a finding of "imminence" does not require a showing that actual harm will
occur immediately so long as the risk of threatened harm is present .... even though the
harm may not be realized for years. Finally, the word "substantiar' [does not require
quantification of the risk if there is some cause for concern that someone may be ex-
posed to risk]. However, injunctive relief should not be granted "where the risk of harm
is remote in time, completely speculative in nature, or de minimus in degree."
36 Envir. Rptr. Cases (BNA) 1228, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citations omitted). See also Dague v.
City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "a finding that an activity
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment does not require actual harm" (citing
Waste Industries, 734 F.2d at 159)) reversed in part, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Puerto Rico Aqueduct,
888 F.2d at 185 (observing that "[ain endangerment means a risk of a harm, not necessarily ac-
tual harm, and proof that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment is grounds for an action seeking equitable relief' (citation omitted)); Conservation
Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 193-94 (holding that "an endangerment need not be an emergency in
order for it to be 'imminent and substantial'" and that "an endangerment is 'imminent' if factors
giving rise to it are present, even though the harm may not be realized for years"); United
States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1394 (D.N.H. 1985) (explaining that
"[e]ndangerment means a threatened or potential harm and does not require proof of actual
harm").
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the legislative history indicates that RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision requires a continuing endangerment resulting from the
defendant's past or present activities.
Initially, the House committee report provides ample evidence
supporting the need for a continuing endangerment under Section
7002(a)(1)(B). The report explains that the 1984 Amendments to
RCRA's citizen suit provision "confers on citizens a limited right
under Section 7002 to sue to abate an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment."226 In addition, the report states that the "primary goal"
of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) is "the prompt abatement of imminent
and substantial endangerments."227 Moreover, the report notes that
"the RCRA regulatory and enforcement program must be conducted in
a manner that controls and prevents present and potential
endangerment to public health and the environment."228 In addition,
the Report explains that the expansion of RCRA's citizen suit
provision was designed to "complement, rather than conflict with, the
Administrator's efforts to eliminate threats as to public health and the
environment, particularly where the Government is unable to take
action because of inadequate resources."229  These excerpts from
RCRA's legislative history support what the plain language and
structure of Section 7002(a)(1)(B) already suggest-that RCRA'simminent citizen suit provision applies only to continuing
endangerments.23 0
This conclusion is further supported by the federal regulations issued by the EPA. See 56
Fed. Reg. 24396 (cited in note 10) CWhile the risk of harm must be imminent in order for the
EPA to act under section 7003, the harm itself need not be. For example, EPA could act if there
exists a likelihood that contaminants might be introduced into a water supply which could cause
damage after a period of latency"); Cook, 3 Law of Hazardous Waste § 15.01[3[c] at 15-12 (cited
in note 224) (explaining that the use of the word "may" was "intended by Congress to provide
the courts with broad equitable powers so as to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes. Thus
Sections 7002 and 7003 are not limited to emergency-type situations" (footnotes omitted)).
226. H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5612 (emphasis added).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "abate" as "[t]o do away with or nullify or lessen or diminish"
and defines abatemene' as [a] reduction, a decrease, or a diminution. The suspension or cessa-
tion in whole or in part, of a continuing charge, such as rent." Black's Law Dictionary 4 (West,
6th ed. 1990). These definitions indicate that something must exist before it may be abated.
227. H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 at 53 (cited in note 31) (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 20.
229. Id. at 53. See S. Rep. No. 98-284 at 55 (cited in note 78) C(The conditions placed on
such suits are intended to assure that they will complement, and not interfere with, Federal
regulatory and enforcement programs").
230. The views of the minority regarding the 1984 Amendments also support the conclusion
that Congress only intended RCRA's citizen suit provision to apply to continuing endanger-
ments. The minority objected to the adoption of § 7002(a)(1)(B) due to the failure of the
committee to amend the provision:
That amendment stated that no district court before which an imminent and substantial
endangerment action is brought is empowered to hear related state law claims. That
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Finally, Senator George Mitchell, the author of the 1984
Amendments to RCRA's citizen suit provision, made clear the need for
a continuing violation during a speech on the senate floor:
Under current law, a citizen may bring suit to enforce a permit or other similar
RCRA requirement if EPA fails to do so. However, citizens are not now aut-
horized to sue to abate an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health
or the environment. If EPA does not act, the endangerment continues.
In light of the thousands of known hazardous waste sites across this
country, this simply does not makes sense.
The Environmental Protection Agency clearly does not have the resources
to deal with all of these sites, nor do the States.
Citizen suits to abate imminent hazards can expand the national effort to
minimize these very real threats to our well-being.
231
Senator Mitchell's repeated use of the term "abate" demonstrates that
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision was only intended to apply to
those situations where the solid or hazardous waste continues to
threaten public health or the environment.
Together, these excerpts from the legislative history of RCRA
Sections 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B) indicate that while RCRA's imminent
hazard authority applies to past or present acts, it applies only to
present or future endangerments. RCRA is designed to promote the
prompt disposal of solid and hazardous waste, not to allocate financial
responsibility where the threat has been eliminated prior to the filing
of the lawsuit.
3. RCRA's Place in the Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme
When RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision is examined in
the context of the comprehensive regulatory scheme Congress con-
structed, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to create a cause of
action for wholly past endangerments under RCRA. If Congress had
intended such a result, it would most likely have drafted RCRA's
citizen suit provision to provide expressly for past remediation ex-
penses. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in KFC, the express
creation of private rights of action for the recovery of environmental
amendment simply clarified what we had understood to be the intention of the citizen
suit provision and that is to give citizens a federal cause of action to abate imminent and
substantial endangerments created by hazardous waste disposal facilities.
Id. at 118-19 (emphasis added). The majority responded to this concern by stating that they
expected the courts "to exercise their discretion concerning pendent jurisdiction in a way that
will not frustrate or delay the primary goal of this provision, namely the prompt abatement of
imminent and substantial endangerments" Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
231. 130 Cong. Rec. 20815 (emphasis added).
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response costs in other statutes, combined with the failure to do so in
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision, indicates that Congress
never intended Section 7002(a)(1)(B) to act as a cost recovery stat-
ute.232
Like RCRA, CERCLA includes a citizen suit provision.233 In
fact, the remedies provided to citizen-plaintiffs in CERCLA Section
310 closely parallel the remedies authorized in RCRA Section
7002(a).2 4 However, CERCLA also authorizes the EPA to recover "all
costs of removal or remedial action 235 and authorizes private citizens
to recover any necessary costs of response.., consistent with the
national contingency plan."236 In addition, CERCLA Section 113(f)(1)
provides that "[a]ny persons may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable" for past environmental
response costs. 23 7 An examination of RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision in light of CERCLA's cost recovery provisions demonstrates
that when Congress intends to create a cause of action for past envi-
ronmental response costs, it does so expressly.238 Congress has ac-
knowledged the difference between providing an action for wholly
past events and authorizing a mechanism to abate continuing endan-
germents. In RCRA, Congress simply did not intend to impose liabil-
ity for actions that no longer present an imminent threat at the time
the lawsuit is filed.
Congress has not only expressly authorized actions for past
cleanup costs under CERCLA, but has also done so in the context of
232. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *10-11 (concluding that CERCLA's use of a cost recovery
provision demonstrates that Congress "knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs,
and that the language used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy").
233. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 6959.
234. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *10-11. Compare RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(authorizing the federal courts "to order.., such action as may be necessary"), with CERCLA §
310, 42 U.S.C. § 6959 (authorizing the federal courts "to order such action as may be necessary
to correct the violation").
235. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
236. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
237. CERCLA § 113(f(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(1) provides that:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section 9607(a) [section 107(a)] of this title, during or following any civil action under
section 9606 [section 106] of this title under section 9607(a) of this title.... In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
238. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1096-97 (concluding that "Congress, knowing its CERCLA citizen
suit provision did not extend the available remedies to include a cause of action for monetary
recovery from other responsible parties, despite the broad 'other action' language (which is also
found in the RCRA citizen suit provision), and wishing to allow such a remedy in certain cases,
enacted § 9613(0(1) [§ 113(0(1)] to provide expressly for contribution").
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RCRA itself. 39  Under RCRA Section 9003(h)(6)(A),240  the
Administrator of the EPA, as well as the state, may recover from the
owner or operator of an underground storage tank the costs incurred
"for undertaking corrective action or enforcement action with respect
to the release of petroleum" from the tank. Section 9003(h)(6)(A),
however, does not authorize private citizens to exercise this authority.
When one considers that Congress has, on at least two occa-
sions, imposed liability for wholly past endangerments, it appears
that the lack of such a provision in RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision demonstrates congressional reluctance rather than legisla-
tive oversight. Together, CERCLA Section 113(f)(1) and RCRA
Section 9003(h)(6)(A) demonstrate that "when Congress wished to
provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
expressly."241
In conclusion, the combination of the language, structure, and
context of RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision leads to the conclu-
sion that Section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not apply when the environ-
mental endangerment has been eliminated. Rather, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant's past or present actions present an
imminent hazard at the time the lawsuit is filed.
B. Available Remedies
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision provides federal courts
with the authority (1) "to restrain any person who has contributed or
who is contributing to" an "imminent and substantial endangerment,"
and (2) "to order such person to take such other action as may be
necessary."242  The second question posed by KFC is whether the
239. In addition, Congress has provided an express provision to recover damages under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act C'SMCRA"). Section 502(f) of SMCRA authorizes
"[a]ny person who is injured in his person or property through the violation by any operator of
any rule, regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to this chapter may bring an action for
damages." 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (1994 ed.).
240. RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(b)(h)(6)(A), provides:
Whenever costs have been incurred by the Administrator, or by a State pursuant to
paragraph (7), for undertaking corrective action or enforcement action with respect to
the release of petroleum from an underground storage tank, the owner or operator of
such tank shall be liable to the Administrator or the State for such costs.
241. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572.
242. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), provides in relevant part:
The district court shall have jurisdiction.., to restrain any person who has contributed
or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both.
Id. (emphasis added). RCRA § 7002(a) was amended in 1984 to expand the remedies available
under the statute. Prior to 1984, district courts were authorized "to enforce such regulation or
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power to order "such other action as may be necessary" is limited to
granting injunctive, as opposed to monetary, relief. As a preliminary
matter, it is important to understand that RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B) is not a statute in which a private cause of action arises
only by implication. If it were, as the Eighth Circuit mistakenly as-
sumed in Furrer,243 the Supreme Court's four-factored test outlined in
Cort2" would undoubtedly apply.245 RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision, however, expressly authorizes the courts to order any relief
they deem appropriate and necessary. The question, therefore, is not
whether a private right of action exists under Section 7002(a)(1)(B),
but whether the scope of the authority given by Congress empowers
the courts to exercise their full equitable jurisdiction, including the
power to order restitution, in fashioning appropriate relief.246
order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty as the case may be." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1982 ed.). The 1984 Amendment most certainly represents an expansion of the
remedies previously available to plaintiffs under RCRA. The difficulty lies in determining the
scope of this new authority.
243. 62 F.3d at 1094 (concluding that RCRA "does not give the district courts express
authority in citizen suits to award money judgments for costs incurred in cleaning up contami-
nated sites. Thus, if such a remedy is to be available, we must find either that Congress, by
authorizing the district court 'to order.., such other action as may be necessary,' implicitly cre-
ated such a remedy, or that the 'cause of action ... may have become part of the federal com-
mon law through the exercise of judicial power to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful
conduct'" (quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90)).
If there were no basis for granting equitable restitution or monetary damages, the Eighth
Circuit's analysis and conclusion would be correct. The issue would be whether Congress in-
tended to imply such relief when it adopted RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision to continu-
ing endangerments outlined in Part WV.A., convincing a court that Congress intended to imply a
remedy for wholly past endangerments would be highly unlikely.
In addition, while a full discussion of the district courts' authority under the federal common
law is beyond the scope of this Note, a court is unlikely to create a federal common law remedy
for those seeking environmental cleanup costs in that both RCRA and CERCLA have been held
to preempt such judicial authority. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp.
1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1069.
244. See note 148 (outlining the fourth part test of Cort v. Ash). It should be noted, how-
ever, that at least two supreme court justices, Justices O'Connor and Scalia, would get the
federal courts out of the business of implying new federal private rights of action altogether.
See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring) ('Under Art. III, Congress alone has the
responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts .... When Congress
chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative
role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction" (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting))).
245. Despite the four factors outlined in Cort, the Court has made clear that the central
inquiry remains "whether Congress intended to create a private right of action," while the four
Cort factors serve as "criteria through which this intent could be discerned." California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
However, the heavy burden of demonstrating that Congress intended to imply a private cause of
action clearly rests with the party asking the court to so interpret the statute. Suter v. Artist
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992).
246. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 (stating that "[in almost any statutory scheme,
there may be a need for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the
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As a general rule, when Congress empowers the federal courts
to grant equitable remedies, the courts are presumed to be authorized
to exercise their full equitable authority unless Congress clearly indi-
cates otherwise. This equitable authority includes the power to order
restititionary damages. 247 In the context of RCRA's imminent citizen
suit provision, Congress has clearly empowered the federal courts to
exercise their broad equitable authority by authorizing the courts to
order any action they deem necessary and appropriate.24 However, as
previously explained, an examination of the language, structure, and
context of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) indicates that Congress in-
tended to limit the provision to the abatement of continuing endan-
germents. 249 Because RCRA is designed to provide a cause of action
only in those cases where an imminent hazard either presently exists
or may in the future exist, federal courts are prohibited from award-
ing the recovery of response costs expended to abate wholly past
endangerments.
authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new
rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adope'). See Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992) (observing that "the question of what
remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of action is 'analytically dis-
tince from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place. Thus, although we exam-
ine the text and history of a statute to determine whether Congress intended to create a right of
action, we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly
indicated otherwise. This principle has deep roots in our jurisprudence" (citations omitted));
Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 (concluding that "the question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is
analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to
receive").
The federal courts have repeatedly distinguished between interpreting a statute and imply-
ing a new cause of action when construing language similar to that used in RORA. See, for ex-
ample, Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that in the context
of a cause of action pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, "Congress has
expressly created a cause of action ... and has empowered the district court to grant 'such relief
as the court determines is appropriate.' Accordingly, the question is simply whether damages
are within the relief foreseen by Congress" (citation omitted)); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d
1205, 1210 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding that "[a] Cort v. Ash analysis is not appropriate be-
cause the issue is not whether there is an implied private right of action. Here Congress has
expressly created a cause of action and empowered the district court to grant such relief as the
court determines appropriate" (citations omitted)).
247. Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10130 (cited in note 14) (concluding that "[a]s a general
rule-absent express congressional instructions to the contrary-statutes that invoke the equi-
table jurisdiction of the courts are presumed to empower the courts to exercise their full equi-
table powers, which includes the power to order restitution in appropriate cases" (citations
omitted)).
248. Indeed, Congress has authorized broad equitable relief for many environmental citizen
suit provisions. Garrett, RCRA Practice Manual at 237 (cited in note 13) (concluding that "[t]he
equitable relief that can be granted in citizen suits is very broad. For example, the court may
order compliance with regulations and permanent closure of a facility. As in civil judicial en-
forcement, the three-pronged test for granting a permanent injunction is less stringent than re-
quests for such injunctions in private actions").
249. See Part IV.A.
1996] RCRA CITIZEN SUITS
1. Equitable Authority of the Federal Courts Generally
It is a well known canon of statutory construction that when
Congress expressly provides a specific right with a specific remedy,
the courts ought to be wary of inferring additional remedies. 250
However, the Supreme Court has long held that courts in their equity
jurisdiction are presumptively empowered to order "all appropriate
relief. 25 This equitable authority includes the power to order pro-
hibitory and mandatory injunctions, to issue writs of mandamus, and
to award restitution, though not the power to order compensatory or
punitive damages.252 Only when Congress clearly and validly indi-
250. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (stating that
"where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be wary of
reading others into if'). The Court has noted, however, that the expression of one remedy or set
of remedies does not necessarily exclude the possibility that other remedies may be implied. As
the Court explained, "the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevi-
tably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available. Such an intent
may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its
enactment." Id.
251. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (citation omitted). The justifications for this presumption in
favor of the courts' full equity jurisdiction are basically two-fold: first, that Congress generally
does not intend to disturb the inherent power of the courts when granting statutory relief, and
second, that Congress is passing legislation generally intends to provide plaintiffs with complete
relief.
252. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2069, 124 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1993) (stating
that "'equitable relief can also refer to those categories of relief that were typically available in
equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)").
Although the precise boundary between restitution, an equitable remedy, and monetary
damages, a legal remedy, is not always clear, see Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance
of Restitution, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1277, 1278-83 (1989), the courts have attempted to distinguish
the two forms of relief. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988). Restitution seeks to
"extract compensation or restore the status quo," while damages are designed to "punish
culpable individuals." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (citing Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974)). As the Fourth Circuit explained:
The distinction, as we see it, is that "[a] person obtains restitution when he is restored to
the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly
had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money" Damages on the other hand, are de-
termined by reference to the loss sustained by a victim as the result of wrongful conduct
on the part of another.
United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153-54 (4th Cir. 1975) (quoting Restatement of
Restitution § 1, comment a (1937)).
Importantly, the mere fact that a remedy requires monetary payment does not necessarily
mean that the remedy is legal in nature. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 393. Rather, restitution will often
take the form of a monetary payment. Id. at 901 (explaining that "[tihe fact that in the present
case it is money rather than in-kind benefits that pass from the federal government to the
states... cannot transform the nature of the relief sought-specific relief, not relief in the form
of damages" (quoting Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1985))); Teamsters v. Terry 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990)
C'Generally, an action for money damages was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the courts
of law.' This Court has not, however, held that 'any award of monetary relief must necessarily
be "legal relief' (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196))). See generally Robert S. Thompson and John
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:689
cates a desire to limit this equitable jurisdiction are the federal courts
restrained in the type of equitable relief they may order.253
In the seminal case of Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,254 the
Supreme Court examined the scope of the federal courts' authority in
situations where Congress had authorized the courts to utilize their
equitable powers.255 Porter concerned Section 205(a) of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, which authorized the district courts, when
the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration had
demonstrated a price control violation, to order "a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order."256 The
Supreme Court, in defining the scope of federal judicial authority
under the phrase "other order," explained that the federal courts are
allowed to invoke "all the inherent equitable powers" when ordering
an appropriate remedy, unless Congress clearly intends otherwise.257
The Court explained that this full equity authority includes the power
to order restitution either as "an equitable adjunct to an injunction
A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies: Damages, Equity and Restitution (Matthew Bender, 2d ed. 1989); Saul
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985).
253. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (concluding that "Congress
may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion, but we do not lightly
assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles"); United States v.
Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 618-20 (1951) (finding that, in the absence of a congressional command to
the contrary, a court in its equity jurisdiction may order restitution when "reasonably appropri-
ate and necessary"); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (holding that
"[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court
are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction"); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66
(holding that "although we examine the text and history of a statute to determine whether
Congress intended to create a right of action, we presume the availability of all appropriate
remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise" (citations omitted)); Mitchell v.
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (explaining that "[w]hen Congress
entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment,
it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete
relief in light of the statutory purposes").
254. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
255. "The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light
inferences or doubtful construction." Id. at 398 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Peters)
497, 503 (1836)). The power of the federal courts to exercise their full equity authority was re-
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Moore, 340 U.S. at 616. Moore concerned § 206(b) of the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947 which, like the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 at issue in
Porter, authorized the courts to issue a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,
or "other order" when responding to an existing or potential rent control violation. Id. at 617-19.
The Court again concluded that the provision invoked the full equity powers of the federal
courts, including the power to order restitution. Id. at 619.
256. Porter, 328 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
257. Id. at 398 (concluding that "[tihe comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a
statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the courts ju-
risdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied").
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decree" or as a necessary and appropriate means to guarantee compli-
ance with the law.258
This well-established approach to defining the scope of the
federal courts' equity authority is also supported by the Restatement
of Restitution. According to Section 115 of the Restatement, a court
may award restitution providing for the reimbursement of costs ex-
pended to perform another's public duty.259 Both state and federal
courts have utilized this section of the Restatement to award restitu-
tion on a number of occasions.260 Importantly, according to the
Restatement, restitution may not be authorized when the perform-
ance of a personal duty only incidentally benefits another party,261 or
when the person who performed the duty was not ordered to do So.
2 62
Of course, the decision to grant restitution in any particular case is
left to the general discretion of the court in light of all the relevant
facts and circumstances including the purposes of the statute.263
2. Equitable Authority of the Federal Courts Under Section
7002(a)(1)(B)
At a minimum, RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision author-
izes the federal courts to exercise a portion of their inherent equitable
jurisdiction. Specifically, Section 7002(a) empowers the federal courts
to restrain those in violation of RCRA's requirements and to order
"such other action as may be necessary" to abate an imminent and
258. Id. at 399-400 (concluding that the "inherent equitable jurisdiction ... clearly author-
izes a court, in its discretion, to decree restitution of excessive charges in order to give effect to
the policy of Congress"). Importantly, Porter was settled law at the time Congress drafted and
adopted RCRA. Thus, the fact that Congress had notice of the presumption favoring the coures
full equitable relief when drafting RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision indicates that a
strong case could be made favoring the full equitable authority of the courts than existed in
Porter itself. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97 (explaining that the courts are to presume that
Congress understands the state of the law when it legislates).
259. The Restatement of Restitution § 115 (ALI, 1937) states:
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying things or services, al-
though acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution from
the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately necessary to satisfy the
requirements of public decency, health, or safety.
260. See, for example, Wyandotte Transportation Co., v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204
(1967); State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
Brandon Tp. v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1977).
261. Restatement of Restitution § 106 (cited in note 259).
262. Id. § 115, comment a.
263. Id. introductory note.
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substantial endangerment.64 Under Porter and its progeny, this
grant of jurisdiction creates a presumption that Congress intended to
authorize the federal courts to exercise their full equitable authority,
including the power to award restitution.265 Considering that nearly
every court to address the issue has held that suits to recover envi-
ronmental cleanup costs constitute actions for equitable restitution,2 66
RCRA would appear to authorize the recovery of environmental re-
sponse costs. 267 The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the
presumption favoring the exercise of the federal courts' full equitable
authority may be rebutted by contrary congressional intent.268 It
seems apparent that Congress has evinced such an intent with re-
spect to RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision.
264. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). According to the Courts decision in KFC, these
powers authorize private citizens to "seek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a re-
sponsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste, or
a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating
RCRA." 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *9-10.
265. See PartVI.B.1.
266. The courts have consistently held that actions to recover environmental response or
abatement costs under CERCLA or RCRA constitute claims for equitable restitution. See, for
example, Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400, 412 (3d Cir. 1995) (CERCLA); American
Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 209, 213-14 (D.R.I. 1993) (CERCLA); United
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (CERCLA);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987) (CERCLA); NEPACCO,
810 F.2d at 749 (RCRA and CERCLA); Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. at 201 (RCRA);
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 912-13 (D.N.H. 1985) (CERCLA); Price, 688 F.2d at
213-14 (RCRA). See also Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1492 nn.46 & 47 (cited in
note 1) (CERCLA).
In addition, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider the distinction between
remedies at law and equity on at least two occasions. First, the Court in Wyandotte held that
the government was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of cleaning up chlorine that was
leaking from the defendants' shipwrecked barge on grounds that the government had provided a
service to the defendants in an effort to protect public health and safety. 389 U.S. at 194-95,
204-05. Second, the Court in Tull held that the imposition of civil penalties authorized by the
Clean Water Act constitutes a legal rather than equitable remedy in that such penalties are de-
signed to punish rather than restore the parties to their original positions. 481 U.S. at 423-24.
The distinction drawn by the Court in Wyandotte and Tull certainly supports the conclusion
that the recovery of environmental response costs constitutes restitution. Recovery of such
costs are simply designed to restore the parties to their original positions.
267. Indeed, at least one commentator would agree with such a conclusion. See J. Martin
Robertson, Restitution under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B): The Courts Finally Grant What Congress
Authorized, 25 Envir. L. Rep. 10491, 10493 (1995) (concluding that "[u]nless specifically limited,
Congress' grant of equitable jurisdiction to the courts is not restricted; in fact, the courts' equi-
table powers are presumed to include all of the traditional equitable powers that the courts
have had historically").
268. KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *14-15. See also note 257 and accompanying text.
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a. Wholly Past Endangerments
Despite the general presumption favoring the full equitable
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it does not appear that Congress
intended to provide a private right of action to recover costs expended
to remediate wholly past endangerments. As discussed at length
earlier, the language, structure, and context of RCRA Section
7002(a)(1)(B) indicate that the provision was only intended to impose
liability for continuing endangerments. 269 Having made this determi-
nation, it seems reasonable, if not inevitable, to conclude that allow-
ing courts to order restitutionary relief relating to endangerments
eliminated prior to the filing of the law suit would be inherently in-
consistent with RCRA's continuing endangerment requirement.
Indeed, the continuing endangerment requirement was an
important factor which led the Supreme Court to conclude that plain-
tiffs cannot receive restitution for past cleanup costs under RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision.270 As Justice O'Connor explained,
"[tihe meaning of this timing restriction is plain: An endangerment
can only be 'imminent' if it 'threatens to occur immediately,' and the
reference to waste which 'may present' imminent harm quite clearly
excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger."271 However,
having determined that RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) requires the
presence of an imminent and substantial endangerment at the time
the law suit is filed it remains to be resolved whether the solid or
hazardous waste must continue to present an imminent hazard
throughout the course of the litigation or whether the provision allows
plaintiffs to take affirmative action to remediate the contaminated
site after litigation has begun and remain eligible to recover their
cleanup costs.
b. Continuing Endangerments
Although rejecting the approach of the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court in KFC expressly declined to consider whether
269. See Part IV.A.
270. In addition to reaffirming the necessity of demonstrating continuing endangerment,
the Supreme Court held that the remedies authorized under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) do not
"contemplate[] the award of past cleanup costs, whether these are denominated 'damages' or
'equitable restitution.'" KFC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *10. Importantly, however, the Court
specifically declined to address whether response costs expended after initiation of the law suit
are recoverable. Id. at *15-16.
271. Id. at *11-12 (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language
1245 (2d ed. 1934)).
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RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision authorizes the courts to order
an injunction requiring a defendant to reimburse citizen plaintiffs for
response costs expended after the commencement of the litigation.272
As explained previously, the language, structure, and context of
RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) indicates that plaintiffs must
demonstrate the existence of an imminent and substantial
endangerment at the time a law suit is filed. However, this evidence,
when examined in light of RCRA's objectives, does not support the
conclusion that the solid or hazardous waste must continue to present
an imminent and substantial endangerment throughout the course of
the litigation.273 Having failed to rebut the presumption favoring the
full equitable authority of the federal courts on this point, RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision ought to be construed in a manner
authorizing the courts to award plaintiffs the recovery of reasonable
cleanup costs expended after initiation of the lawsuit. This
interpretation of RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) not only complies with
the provision's preliminary requirements, but promotes the prompt
abatement of imminent hazards by allowing plaintiffs to clean up
hazardous waste sites at the front end of the litigation rather than
waiting until completion of the law suit years later.274
272. Id. at *15-16 (citing Price, 688 F.2d at 211-13).
273. In order to reach this conclusion, it is important to remember where the analysis be-
gins. According to Porter and its progeny, when Congress grants the federal courts the author-
ity to exercise a portion of their equitable authority, the courts are presumed to have the
authority to exercise their full equitable authority unless it can be shown that Congress in-
tended otherwise. See Part IV.B.1. Because Congress authorized the courts to exercise at least
a portion of their equitable authority under RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision, the courts
are presumed to be authorized to award the recovery of response costs as a form of equitable
restitution. Although the language, structure and context of § 7002(a)(1)(B) successfully rebut
the presumption that the federal courts are authorized to award response costs for wholly past
endangerments, the same evidence does not successfully rebut the presumption that the courts
may award the recovery of response costs incurred after the initiation of the law suit. See KFC,
1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *10-13, *15-16 (concluding that § 7002(a)(1)(B) does not authorize the
recovery of costs expended to remediate wholly past endangerments, but withholding judgment
as to whether the provision authorizes the recovery of abatement costs expended after the "the
invocation of RCRA's statutory process").
274. Although interpreting RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision to authorize the recov-
ery of response costs expended after the initiation of the litigation would go a long way to ensure
that plaintiffs are. adequately compensated, this interpretation is far from a perfect solution.
Plaintiffs will still have to wait a minimum of ninety days before filing suit. See RCRA §
7002(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(6)(2)(A). If a private party does not have the luxury of waiting
ninety days and cannot file a claim under CERCLA's cost recovery provision, he or she may be
left to the remedies provided under state law. The Ninth Circuit in KFC noted, however, that
while potential plaintiffs may occasionally avail themselves of state common law remedies, such
opportunities often ring hollow in the face of this particular type of litigation. 49 F.3d at 523
n.6. See Melinda H. Van der Reis, Comment, An Amendment for the Environment: Alternative
Liability and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1269, 1289 (1994)
(concluding that "[iut may take years, sometimes decades, for the effects of improper handling of
hazardous waste to manifest. Plaintiffs bear injuries from acts that occurred years before, and
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As previously explained, the use of a notice requirement, lack
of a statute of limitations, and utilization of the past and present
tenses in RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision indicate that plain-
tiffs must demonstrate the existence of a continuing endangerment at
the time the law suit is filed.27s However, this evidence does not sup-
port the conclusion that the solid or hazardous waste must continue
to threaten public health and the environment throughout the course
of the litigation.
Initially, RCRA's notice provision gives the EPA an
opportunity to file suit in lieu of the private citizen and to provide the
defendant with an opportunity to settle the dispute before litigation
begins.276 These objectives are defeated when plaintiffs clean up the
site before filing suit-hence the need for the continuing endan-
germent requirement.277 However, the objectives of RCRA's notice
provision remain fulfilled when a plaintiff waits until after filing the
lawsuit before undertaking abatement measures; the EPA and the
state will still have ninety days to decide whether to take over the
litigation and the defendant will still have ninety days to decide
whether to settle the matter out of court. Therefore, while RCRA's
notice provision indicates that Section 7002(a)(1)(B) was not intended
to apply to wholly past endangerments, it does not support the
the lapse of time between cause and effect erects a barrier for plaintiffs' recovery. When the
defendants' acts occurred years before the plaintiffs' injuries, recovery under traditional burden
rules is almost impossible. 'Because toxic waste pollution injuries do not fit into th[e] common
law tort mold, victims are not compensated"' (quoting Palma J. Strand, Note, The
Inapplicability of Traditional Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim
Compensation, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 618 (1993))); Kenneth J. Warren, Emerging Trends in
Litigation; Seeking Recovery for Costs of remediating Petroleum Contamination, Legal
Intelligencer 11 (Sept. 11, 1995) (claiming that "[s]tate common law remedies, when not entirely
proscribed, often presented difficult evidentiary issues such as fingerprinting the fuel oil to as-
certain its source and establishing the time period of disposar' (citing Peco v. Hercules, 762 F.2d
303 (3rd Cir. 1985))).
Other commentators, however, have asserted that the common law remedies may prove
quite potent. See, for example, Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Common Law Remedies and the
UST Regulations, 21 B.C. Envir. Afft L. Rev. 619 (1994) (concluding that "[a] popular myth in
environmental law has maintained that individuals injured by pollution, such as a leaking tank,
had little recourse at common law. An examination of common law actions for private nuisance,
trespass, public nuisance and strict liability tells a different story. In fact, polluters often found
themselves facing a successful plaintiff armed with a court injunction, and thus could choose
either to bargain with the neighbor or cease business. Common law provided several remedies
for victims of gasoline storage tank contamination" (footnote omitted)). While Hayward admits
that the common law remedies contain many problems for potential plaintiffs, she maintains
that "the regulatory regime that has generally replaced private law remedies does no better,
and perhaps does worse." Id. at 620.
275. KC, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *11-13. See Part IV.A.
276. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26-27. See notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
277. See note 217 and accompanying text.
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conclusion that plaintiffs are precluded from taking action to
remediate the site during the course of the litigation.
An examination of RCRA's lack of a statute of limitations fur-
ther supports the conclusion that plaintiffs are not barred from taking
remedial action after commencement of the lawsuit. Even assuming
that RCRA's failure to include a statute of limitations for Section
7002(a)(1)(B) provides conclusive evidence that Congress never in-
tended to create a private right of action to recover response costs
related to wholly past endangerments,278 the lack of a limitations
period does not indicate that a plaintiff cannot begin abatement
measures during the course of the litigation. Statutes of limitation
are primarily designed to eliminate stale claims.279 However, requir-
ing the presence of an imminent and substantial endangerment at the
time the lawsuit is filed adequately ensures that stale claims will not
be brought under RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision. Having
determined that adopting a statute of limitations for Section
7002(a)(1)(B) would be unnecessary, the congressional failure to in-
clude a limitations period in no way indicates that plaintiffs should
not be able to recover the reasonable costs associated with actions
taken to remediate imminent hazards after the litigation begins.
At first glance, RCRA's use of the past and present tense in
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) appears to make a stronger case for requiring a
continuing endangerment throughout the course of the litigation than
does RCRA's inclusion of a notice requirement or failure to include a
statute of limitations. As explained previously, use of the phrase
"may present" rather than "may have presented" when referring to
the type of endangerments covered by RCRA's imminent citizen suit
provision strongly suggests that the solid or hazardous waste must
continue to present an environmental hazard when the plaintiff files
suit.280 Upon close examination, however, the past/present tense
distinction does not support the conclusion that the waste must con-
tinue to present an imminent hazard throughout the course of the
litigation. Rather, the language of RCRA Section 7002(a) suggests
278. See Part IV.A.I.b.
279. Limitation ofActions § 17, 51 Am. Jur. 2d (1970) (explaining that "[t]he mischief which
statutes of limitation are intended to remedy is the general inconvenience resulting from delay
in the assertion of a legal right which it is practicable to assert. Thus, while one of the purposes
of the statutes of limitation is to relieve a court system from dealing with 'stale" claims, where
the facts in dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured,
there is another element of a more substantive character in the protection of the potential de-
fendants from protracted fear of litigation").
280. See Part IV.A.I.a.
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just the opposite-that the imminent and substantial endangerment
requirement need only be satisfied at the time the lawsuit is filed.
Section 7002(a) is structurally divided into two parts.28' The
first part describes the conditions plaintiffs must satisfy before initi-
ating a lawsuit under RCRA's various citizen suit provisions. 82 The
second part outlines the remedies a court may award once the plain-
tiff has proven his or her case.283 Importantly, the requirement that
the solid or hazardous waste present an imminent and substantial
endangerment is located in the first part of Section 7002(a), which
describes the conditions for commencing the lawsuit, and not in the
second part, which defines the type of relief a court may award after
the case has been won.
The requirement portion of Section 7002(a) states that "any
person may commence" a suit against anyone "who has contributed or
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment .... "284 The critical language is "may commence." Although
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision requires the presence of a
continuing endangerment when the lawsuit is filed, compliance with
this requirement is only necessary to initiate the lawsuit, not to main-
tain the lawsuit.
The remedy portion of Section 7002(a) says nothing of the need
for an imminent endangerment. It provides that a court may
"restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-
posal of any solid or hazardous waste," or "to order such person to
take such other action as may be necessary." This portion of Section
7002(a) does not attempt to limit the authority of the courts to reme-
diate continuing endangerments. Rather, once the lawsuit is suc-
cessfully commenced, a court may, within its equitable discretion,
281. The first part will be referred to as the "requirement" portion of Section 7002(a). The
second part will be referred to as the "remedy" portion.
282. RCRA § 7002(a) provides for three different types of citizen suits. First, § 7002(a)(2),
authorizes a citizen to sue the Administrator of the EPA to perform a nondiscretionary act or
duty. RCRA § 7002(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). Second, § 7002(a)(1)(A), authorizes a citizen to
sue any person in violation of RCRA's requirements or regulations. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). Finally, § 7002(a)(1)(B) authorizes a citizen to sue any person
contributing to an imminent and substantial endangerment. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B).
283. Although § 7002(a) outlines the remedies a court may award under each of the three
types of citizen suit provisions, this Part will only address the remedies available under RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision.
284. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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order any relief the court finds necessary and appropriate,285 including
the recovery of environmental cleanup costs expended after initiation
of the lawsuit.286
Explained differently, the continuing endangerment require-
ment serves as a threshold issue that must be satisfied before a court
considers awarding an appropriate remedy. Should a plaintiff fail to
comply with this preliminary requirement, the question of what relief
a court may order never becomes relevant-RCRA's imminent citizen
suit provision cannot provide a remedy unless the provision's
preliminary requirements are satisfied. However, once the hurdle of
proving the existence of a continuing endangerment has been over-
come and jurisdiction has attached, the federal courts should be pre-
sumed to exercise their full equitable authority.
Not only does the statutory evidence fail to prove that the solid
or hazardous waste must continue to present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment throughout the course of the litigation, an
examination of RCRA's objectives indicates that such a result should
be avoided. RCRA states that its primary purpose is to "promote the
protection of health and the environment."287 Moreover, RCRA de-
clares it to be the national policy of the United States to reduce or
eliminate "the generation of hazardous waste.., as expeditiously as
possible" and to treat, store, or dispose of any waste that is generated
"so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and
the environment."288
285. A number of cases have noted that Congress gave the courts broad authority to grant
equitable relief under RCRA. See, for example, Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383; Conservation Chemical,
619 F. Supp. at 199; NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 739-40; Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1109-10;
Fallowfield Development, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6233 at *37 ("RCRA grants this Court broad
discretion to fashion an appropriate legal or equitable remedy"); Price, 688 F.2d at 211 C'By
enacting the endangerment provisions of RCRA and SDWA, Congress sought to invoke the
broad and flexible equity powers of the federal courts in instances where hazardous wastes
threatened human health" (citing S. Rep. No. 96-172 at 5 (cited in note 88))). See also H.R. Rep.
No. 98-198 at 47-49 (cited in note 31) (explaining that "due to the nature of hazards presented
by disposal sites, Section 7003 is intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant
affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risks posed by toxic
wastes"' (quoting Price 688 F.2d at 213-14)); H.R. Committee Print No. IFC at 32 (cited in note
88) (concluding that Section 7003 was intended to confer "overriding authority to respond to
situations involving a substantial endangerment to health or the environment').
286. See, for example, Wyandotte Transportation, 389 U.S. at 204 (concluding that restitu-
tion was necessary to avoid "the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer
shifting responsibility for the consequence of his negligence onto his victim").
287. RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
288. Id. § 1003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b). As the court stated in Price, "[p]rompt preventive
action [is] the most important consideration." 688 F.2d at 214. See H.R. ConE Rep. No. 98-
1133, at 119 (cited in note 97); S. Rep. No. 96-172 at 5 (cited in note 88). Justice O'Connor
states in KFC that 'RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste
sites or to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of environmental hazards"
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Construing RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision in such a
manner so as to prohibit citizen plaintiffs from taking action to abate
environmental threats after commencement of a lawsuit would
unnecessarily frustrate the objectives outlined by Congress. Although
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) requires the presence of a continuing endan-
germent at the outset of the litigation, neither the statutory evidence
nor the legislative history indicates that the solid or hazardous waste
must continue to threaten public health and the environment while
the wheels of justice slowly turn. Such a result would not only mag-
nify the risks posed by the waste,28 9 but would also exacerbate the
but that its "primary purpose. ... is to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure
the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated." 1996
U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *7-8. That said, it seems apparent that Congress was seriously concerned
about controlling the impact of hazardous waste on public health and the environment and that
the courts ought to encourage citizens, within the regulatory scheme designed by Congress, to
take remedial measures as soon as possible.
289. As Anderson, Mandelker, and Tarlock explain:
[c]hemical waste dumps have long been known to be dangerous. Just how dangerous
and numerous they are was fully appreciated only in the mid-1970s. For decades, large
quantities of dangerous residues, largely from industrial processes, have been accumu-
lating on generators' premises or at dump sites to which the wastes have been trans-
ported.... As time has passed, storage containers, ponds, and burial grounds have been
adversely affected by corrosion, breakage, natural processes, and acts of vandalism, so
that the waste material has begun to disperse in ground and surface waters, in the soil,
and in the air....
Loosed in the environment, waste chemicals often display a deathly versatility.
They may explode, ignite, or bring instant death from inhalation of their fumes. But
more often they work indirectly and incrementally, just as other toxic substances do,
insinuating themselves slowly, revealing themselves through mild symptoms, which are
usually attributable to another, far less offensive, source. Human exposure occurs via
direct contact with the skin, inhalation, or ingestion of drinking water and food in which
toxicants may be reconcentrated. The numbers of persons and environmental systems
threatened are high, although incidents of actual harm are not yet numerous. Potential
impacts on human health range from acute and chronic impacts on the respiratory,
nervous, alimentary, and urological systems to cancer, infant deformity, and permanent
genetic impairment, as in the case of other toxic substances.
Environmental Protection at 601-02 (cited in note 2).
Unfortunately, these problems become worse the longer the hazardous waste site goes un-
remediated. As Roger C. Dower explains:
[A] hazardous waste site may continue to pollute long after it has ceased accepting new
wastes. One can stop an industrial facility from polluting the air by shutting down the
plant. In a similar fashion, one can stop a planes production of hazardous wastes.
However, environmental and health risks may always be associated with a disposal fa-
cility even after it has closed. This characteristic has important implications for the de-
sign of effective regulatory and enforcement strategies, as we will see.
Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes in Paul R. Portney, ed., Public Policies for Environmental
Protection 151, 154 (Resources For the Future, 1990). See id. ("[Hiazardous wastes can affect all
environmental media-air, water, and land. As noted above, wastes placed in metal barrels
may begin over time to leak into the ground, and may slowly seep through the soil into
underground aquifers or be carried through surface runoff into streams or rivers. Emissions
from wastes stored above ground may mix with the surrounding air to pose a health threat to
those downwind from or near the site. And with hazardous wastes the relevant linkages
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costs of eventual remediation. 90 Considering the detrimental effects
that may result from postponing cleanup efforts, it is doubtful that
Congress intended to craft such a restriction. 291
Further evidence supporting the conclusion that plaintiffs may
take action after initiation of the law suit can be found in the thought-
ful decision of the Third Circuit in United States v. Price.292 There the
EPA filed a motion requesting the court to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion ordering the defendants to pay for a diagnostic study of the haz-
ardous waste site.293 The district court denied the motion, concluding
between the disposal of wastes and their ultimate effects on health and the environment can be
much more numerous and complex than the linkages involved with conventional pollutants.
Exposure routes are not often direct and may involve several different avenues
simultaneously").
290. Although there is some dispute as to whether remediation of hazardous waste sites is
an efficient use of resources, once remedial action becomes inevitable, it certainly makes sense
to take action as soon as possible rather than let the site continue to contaminate the environ-
ment. National Commission on the Environment, Choosing a Sustainable Future 99 (Island
Press, 1993) ('There is now widespread recognition that preventing pollution is more effective
and efficient than seeking to limit through control mechanisms at the 'end-of-the-pipe.' While
end-of-the-pipe approaches have resulted in considerable progress, they do not appear capable of
addressing pressing problems successfully").
291. Moreover, plaintiffs under a legal obligation to remediate a contaminated site will
often lack the time to seek a mandatory injunction in the courts. Resolution of these cases typi-
cally takes years. Requiring citizen plaintiffs to wait for the slow judicial proces would effec-
tively make the citizen suit provision useless for those who need it the most-innocent citizens
with a financial stake in the property and potential liability for not cleaning up the contamina-
tion. As the Ninth Circuit explained in KFC, "[w]hen the government orders clean-up, the inno-
cent citizen must respond expeditiously to the order. There is no time to sue for 'other equitable
relief in the form of a mandatory clean-up injunction against past polluters who may or may not
still be on the scene." 49 F.3d at 523.
To interpret RCRA!s citizen suit provision to prohibit a plaintiff from receiving compensa-
tion for actions taken after notice has been given, after the defendant has had an opportunity to
remediate the site, and after suit has been filed would substantially diminish the ability of the
statute to clean up environmental contamination as expeditiously as possible. Id. Moreover,
allowing those responsible for creating public health hazards to freely disregard their public
duty to abate those hazards, free from any obligation to compensate those who take remedial
actions on their behalf, would encourage individuals to evade their legal obligations and would
unfairly punish innocent citizens forced to assist with the government's abatement efforts. Id.
Indeed, innocent parties have a greater need for restitutionary remedy than does the
Administrator of the EPA. The Administrator has the benefit of controlling the timing of the
cleanup and of ordering the responsible parties to clean up the site. Conversely, private citizens
are often left with no choice but to clean up the hazardous waste site immediately or face sanc-
tions. As the Ninth Circuit in KFC explained, "[tihe right to reimbursement becomes important
to the Administrator only when contamination requires prompt attention, which is always the
case for private citizens who are ordered to remedy contamination." Id. at 524.
292. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). See notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
293. Id. at 208. Although the action in Price was based on RCRA § 7003, the EPA's
imminent hazard authority, the decision is highly relevant to the scope of § 7002(a)(1)(B),
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision, in that liability under the two provisions was designed
by Congress to be identical. See note 78 and accompanying text.
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that such relief was barred as a matter of law.29 4 The Third Circuit
reversed this ruling but agreed with the district court that ordering
the defendants to pay for the study may not have been an appropriate
form of preliminary relief in this particular circumstance. 295 The
court, however, proposed another option available to the EPA:
In those circumstances, the most practical and effective solution may well have
been to refuse the government's request for a preliminary injunction thereby
necessitating the study be undertaken by EPA without delay. Prompt preven-
tive action was the most important consideration. Reimbursement could
thereafter be directed against those parties ultimately found to be liable.296
In ruling that the EPA could conduct the diagnostic study rather than
waiting years for a court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering the
defendants to take such action, the Third Circuit acknowledged that
RCRA's imminent hazard authority authorizes plaintiffs to take re-
medial action after commencement of the law suit and, where appr-
opriate, to recover their reasonable response costs. 297
Finally, although the interpretation of Section 7002(a)(1)(B)
advocated by this Note would allow plaintiffs to recover reasonable
remediation costs under certain proscribed circumstances, it would
not turn RCRA into a watered-down cost recovery statute thereby
rending CERCLA obsolete. 298 Actions governed by RCRA and
294. Price 688 F.2d at 209. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that "an
extensive geohydrological study of the area around the landfill was 'essential in devising a
strategy to contain and mitigate the pollution and to protect Atlantic City's water supply,' and
that it was 'imperative that such a study be done immediately."' Id.
295. Id. at 214 (concluding that "it may well be that the public interest counseled against
the grant of the requested preliminary relief. Very large sums of money were required to pay
for the diagnostic study, and there may have been some question about the original defendants'
financial ability to fund it').
296. Id. This case demonstrates where NEPACCO and Aceto went wrong. In those cases,
the Eighth Circuit should not have allowed the EPA to recover the remediation costs expended
prior the filing of the lawsuit. This restriction should not prove to be a problem considering that
the EPA is largely able to control when abatement actions must take place. RCRA § 7003(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to order those contributing to an
imminent and substantial endangerment "to take such other action as may be necessary").
297. Importantly, the mere fact that the EPA took action to remediate the endangerment
does not ensure that the government will recover all of its response costs. For example, a court
may find that the defendants did not contribute to the environmental endangerment or that cer-
tain remedial actions were unnecessary or unreasonable. In the context of abating an imminent
hazard, restitution is "limited to the reasonable costs for abatement, not necessarily the amount
expended, and does not extend to future costs" Schenectady Chemicals, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
Plaintiffs will not be free from risk should they take measures to clean up the hazardous waste
site after commencement of the litigation. However, given the importance of taking action as
quickly as possible, courts should allow plaintiffs to take action after filing the lawsuit.
298. The Court held in KFC that the language and structure of CERCLA when compared
with the language and structure of RCRA indicated that RCRA was not intended to extend to
wholly past endangerments. 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1955 at *10-11. Indeed, if RCRA were to be in-
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CERCLA would remain fundamentally distinct. Although filing suit
under RCRA offers plaintiffs some important advantages, 29 RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision does not provide for the recovery of
environmental response costs when a private party cleans up the
contaminated waste site before taking the matter to court. Plaintiffs
seeking to follow this course of action will have to file suit under
CERCLA's cost recovery provisions. 300 Unlike CERCLA, RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision requires that the solid or hazardous
waste continue to present "an imminent and substantial endanger-
terpreted as applying to past endangerments as the Ninth Circuit's did in KFC, the balance be-
tween RCRA and CERCLA would be seriously disrupted, rendering CERCLA obsolete. See, for
example, Hazardous Waste: U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Decide if Cleanup Costs Recoverable
Under RCRA, Daily Rep. for Executives 188 (Sept. 28, 1995) (characterizing the decision as "a
significant expansion of RCRA remedies, with procedural and substantive advantages that could
virtually subsume the cost recovery and contribution provisions of the superfund law"); Citizens
Can Recover Pollution Cleanup Costs, Natl. L. J. B2 (March 13, 1995) (stating that the decision
"could greatly expand environmental cleanup litigation"); Todd Woody, Court Broadens Rights
for Owners of Polluted Land; Ninth Circuit Ruling Allows Suits for Cleanup Costs Under RCRA,
Recorder (March 2, 1995) (concluding that the decision "could dramatically expand hazardous
waste litigation"); Richard M. Kuntz, Private Parties Gain New Tool to Recover Cleanup Costs,
Chicago Daily L. Bull. 6 (April 17, 1995) (concluding that "[tiaken together, KFC and Valentine
would appear to also allow a right of contribution in RCRA section 7002 citizen suits. Thus,
both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and RCRA
may now provide a seamless web from which private parties can fashion may have surpassed
the attractiveness of CERCLA to a private plaintiff').
299. RCRA's citizen suit provision has a number of advantages over CERCLA. First, RCRA
covers a larger scope of substances, including waste petroleum, than does CERCLA. Cooke, 3
Law of Hazardous Waste § 15.01[3][a] at 15-10 (cited in note 224) (noting that certain distinc-
tions between CERCLA and RCRA "provide Section 7003 and its Section 7002 citizen suit
counterpart with a broader scope of coverage than CERCLA for all practical purposes, for al-
though the purview of Section 7003 is limited to waste materials, it is generally waste that have
been disposed of or spilled that normally present such a hazard rather than containerized virgin
materials"). See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378 (concluding that "CERCLA's sweep, while broad, is
more limited than RCRA's in terms of the substances it covers... [with] CERCLA liabil-
ity... attach[ing] only to those responsible for 'hazardous substances' as defined in the stat-
ute"). Second, RCRA authorizes the award of litigation costs, "(including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party." RCRA § 7002(e), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(e). Third, under RCRA's citizen suit provision, plaintiffs are authorized to seek
civil penalties. RCRA §§ 3008(a) and (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a) and (g). Fourth, plaintiffs do not
have to comply with the National Contingency Plan. Under CERCLA, a private party must
demonstrate that the costs incurred were consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B). See Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10123 (cited in note 14) ("To
name a few of § 7002(a)(1)(B)'s advantages: It provides specifically for recovery of attorneys fees
by private parties, it does not require compliance with the national contingency plan, and it
authorizes courts to issue mandatory cleanup orders. The section's most glaring disadvantages
are its failure to provide specifically for restitution of past response costs, and its failure to
provide for recovery of private damages"). Despite RCRA's advantages over CERCLA, there is
little reason to fear a flood of lawsuits under this interpretation. See id. (concluding that RCRA
is nothing more than a codification of nuisance law and that "iust as state courts do not appear
to have a large backlog of frivolous common law nuisance lawsuits, there is no particular reason
to fear that federal courts will entertain frivolous litigation under § 7002(a)(1)(B)").
300. See note 14 and accompanying text.
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ment to public health and the environment" at the time the lawsuit is
filed.30' However, after the preliminary requirements of RCRA
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) have been satisfied, citizen-plaintiffs ought to be
able to clean up the hazardous waste site and, if a court decides that




Although expanding RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision to
allow private citizens to recover costs expended to remediate past
endangerments as the Ninth Circuit did in KFC may seem initially
appealing, the Supreme Court was correct to reverse the decision for
at least two reasons. First, the language, structure, and context of
RCRA's imminent citizen suit provision indicates that plaintiffs must
demonstrate the presence of a continuing endangerment at the time
the lawsuit is filed. Authorizing citizens to recover their response
costs for past environmental hazards despite RCRA's continuing en-
dangerment requirement unjustifiably ignores the regulatory scheme
devised by Congress. Second, expanding RCRA's imminent citizen
suit provision to include past endangerments is unnecessary in that
RCRA authorizes the courts to order any action they deem appropr-
iate and necessary provided the technical prerequisites of Section
7002(a)(1)(B) have been satisfied.
301. See Part IV.A.
302. Such an approach would not only be more expedient, it may also be more efficient than
filing an action under CERCLA. As one commentator has explained:
The strict, joint, several, and retroactive nature of liability under § 7002(a)(1)(B) is
remarkably similar to liability under CERCLA. Thus, like CERCLA, § 7002(a)(1)(B)
raises the stakes for releases of potentially dangerous pollution, encouraging waste
minimization efforts that go beyond bare-minimum compliance with environmental
regulations. Unlike CERCLA, however, § 7002(a)(1)(B) is not tied to a potentially waste-
ful government cleanup program. Indeed, because it allows the private sector to address
pollution problems without the need for intervention by the EPA bureaucracy, RCRA's
citizen imminent hazard authority may be one of Congress's least complicated, most
cost-effective environmental protection initiatives.
Babich, 24 Envir. L. Rep. at 10136 (cited in note 14). See id. at 10123 (concluding further that
"the open-ended nature of provisions like § 7002(a)(1)(B) helps fuel private waste-minimization
efforts that, ultimately, may be a more effective check on pollution than traditional, command-
and-control government regulation"). See also Beverly McQueary Smith, Recent Developments
in Citizens's Suits Under Selected Federal Environmental Statutes, in 2 ALI-ABA Course of
Study: Environmental Law 701, 703 (Feb. 15-18, 1995) (concluding that "[iln a time of limited
resources to fulfill their legislative mandates, when governmental enforcers cannot or will not
seek compliance from polluters, citizens' suits remain appealing gapfillers. Citizens' suits
provide another vehicle for doing more with less").
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Having complied with RCRA's notice and continuing endan-
germent requirements upon commencement of the lawsuit, plaintiffs
should be allowed to take affirmative action to abate imminent haz-
ards and, when appropriate, to recover their reasonable response
costs. This approach gives defendants the option of remediating the
hazardous waste site themselves rather than compensating plaintiffs
for doing so, but at the same time ensures that plaintiffs will have the
opportunity to take affirmative action, should a defendant decline the
option, without waiting years for the litigation to come to a conclu-
sion. Indeed, allowing plaintiffs to rehabilitate the waste site at the
front end of the litigation would serve the primary objective of RCRA's
imminent citizen suit provision-the prompt abatement of imminent
endangerments-without abandoning wholesale the provision's pre-
liminary requirements.
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